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Abstract
Drawing on representative samples of the U.S. population with more than 15,000
respondents in total, we measure and experimentally vary people’s beliefs about the
informativeness of news. Inconsistent with the desire for more information being
the dominant motive for people’s news consumption, treated respondents who think
that a newspaper is less likely to suppress information reduce their demand for news
from this newspaper. Furthermore, treated respondents who think that a news outlet
is more likely to make false claims do not reduce their demand for this outlet. These
findings strongly suggest that people have other motives to read news that sometimes
conflict with their desire for more information. We discuss the implications of our
findings for the regulation of media markets. (JEL D83, D91, L82)
Keywords: News Consumption, Information, Media Bias, Belief Polarization, Informa-
tiveness.
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1 Introduction
What motivates people to consume economic and political news? Consistent with a core
principle in standard economics—that more information is always better—Americans cite
getting the facts right as their single most valued factor when choosing a specific news
source (Young, 2016). While an overwhelming majority of Americans also say that the
news media should be unbiased in its coverage of political issues (Mitchell, 2018), a large
literature has documented that newspapers report news in a biased way by slanting their
news stories toward the beliefs of their readers (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2010).
There are two main competing explanations for why people consume biased news.
The first explanation is that people want more informative news but perceive news that are
closer to their prior beliefs as more informative (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006). Consistent
with this explanation, both liberals and conservatives consider politically-aligned news
outlets as more trustworthy (Mitchell and Weisel, 2014). The second explanation is
that people have other motives to read news that sometimes conflict with expanding their
knowledge, such as a preference for belief confirmation (Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005).
The relative importance of these two explanations has important implications for the
optimal regulation of media markets, such as the welfare effects of regulations to increase
competition. Despite its relevance for optimal policy, there is no direct evidence on whether
the desire for more information dominates other motives for reading news. Previous studies
on news consumption cannot identify whether the desire for more information dominates
other motives because perceptions of informativeness are unobserved in observational
data. To circumvent this challenge, we propose an experimental approach that allows us
to measure and exogenously change perceptions about the informativeness of news.
In a series of experiments with over 15,000 Americans, we use two complementary
designs to achieve exogenous variation in the perceived informativeness of news articles.
We then measure news demand using real articles on economic and political news. The
experiments were designed to change beliefs about informativeness without changing
beliefs about the complexity or technicality of reporting. The experiments thus allow us to
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test whether people value more informative news in a setting where cognitive constraints
are not binding. Our criterion for comparing the informativeness of news outlets is
Blackwell’s (1951) ranking of information structures—the benchmark for evaluating the
information content of signals. While it is usually not possible to compare the Blackwell
informativeness of different news articles, we designed the experiments such that the
news articles should be perceived as strictly more or less Blackwell informative by
treated respondents. We use a simple model to outline the theoretical foundation for the
predictions of the more-information-is-better principle in both experimental designs.
In the main experiment, we generate exogenous variation in the perceived informative-
ness of news by informing treated respondents that the New York Times did not strategically
suppress information from a news article. Specifically, we first tell our respondents that
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Congress’s official nonpartisan provider of cost
and benefit estimates for legislation, published a report about the “Trump Healthcare Plan”
(the American Health Care Act of 2017). Respondents are told that the CBO estimated
that the plan would decrease the federal deficit by $119 billion (contradicting claims made
by Democrats) and leave 23 million more people uninsured (contradicting claims made by
Republicans). To elicit beliefs about the informativeness of news, we then tell respondents
that the New York Times wrote an article about the CBO report and ask about the subjective
percent chance that it only reported the statistic on the federal deficit, only the statistic
on the number of uninsured, or both statistics. This allows us to quantify beliefs about
the informativeness of news articles in the New York Times: Reporting both statistics is
strictly more informative (in the Blackwell sense) than selectively reporting only infor-
mation that favors one of the parties. To generate exogenous variation in perceptions of
informativeness, we then inform treated respondents that the New York Times reported
both statistics from the CBO report. To measure how the information affects the demand
for news, we offer all respondents free access to an article in the New York Times covering
a CBO report on a different topic, namely the “Trump Tax Plan” (the Tax Cuts and Jobs
Act of 2017). We also ask a series of belief questions to shed light on mechanisms.
The treatment generates a strong and significant effect on perceptions of the informa-
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tiveness of news in the New York Times: Treated respondents are 6.8 percentage points
more likely to think that the New York Times did not suppress a key statistic contradicting
claims by Democrats in a news article about the CBO report on the Trump Tax Plan.
The treatment also affects more general perceptions of the New York Times: Treated
respondents are less likely to think that it is politically biased and more likely to think
that it provides high-quality news. Given our treatment effects on perceptions, the more-
information-is-better principle predicts a strict increase in the demand for news from
the New York Times. In stark contrast to this prediction, the main result of the paper
is that respondents who learn that the New York Times does not suppress information
significantly reduce their demand for news from this newspaper by 3.5 percentage points.
This corresponds to a 13 percent reduction in the demand for news.
Examining heterogeneity in treatment responses, we find that the negative treatment
effect is mainly driven by respondents who thought the New York Times was more likely
to suppress facts contradicting claims made by their own political party, a result that is
broadly consistent with people having a preference for belief confirmation. We further
run a series of mechanism experiments to rule out alternative explanations of our main
finding. First, we run a placebo experiment suggesting that cognitive constraints are not
binding in our setting. In this experiment, we inform respondents that the CBO highlighted
two key statistics in a report on healthcare without providing any further information
about the content of the report. Treated respondents are then informed that the New York
Times reported both key statistics in its coverage of the CBO report. In this experiment,
where other potentially conflicting psychological motives, such as a preference for belief
confirmation, arguably play no role, we do not observe a decrease in the demand for news.
Second, we run a replication experiment that uses a different set of news articles and
also addresses concerns about differential curiosity across treatment arms about how the
New York Times covers CBO reports. In this experiment, we find a 4.7 percentage point
decrease in demand for news—an even larger effect size than in the main experiment.
Third, we run additional experiments to show that rational mechanisms cannot explain the
main result.
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In the second main experiment, we provide another test of the more-information-
is-better principle by studying how perceptions of false claims affect the demand for
news. The design complements the first main experiment by changing perceptions of a
different source of variation in informativeness and by studying a different news outlet.
Specifically, we first tell our respondents that the U.S. recently extracted a high-level spy
from Russia. We then inform our respondents that some media outlets correctly reported
that the CIA extracted the spy because of widespread media speculation about its sources,
whereas other media outlets falsely reported that CIA extracted the spy because it feared
that President Trump would mishandle classified information.1 To elicit pre-treatment
beliefs about the likelihood of false claims made by CNN, we ask respondents about their
subjective percent chance that CNN reported that the CIA extracted the spy due to media
speculation about its sources or due to concerns about President Trump. To generate
exogenous variation in perceptions of false claims, we then inform treated respondents
that CNN reported that the reason for the extraction was concerns about President Trump.
To measure how the information affects the demand for news, we offer all respondents
free access to a news article in CNN about the impeachment process against President
Trump. Finally, we ask a series of questions that shed light on mechanisms.
The treatment generates a highly significant first stage on perceptions of false claims
made by CNN. Treated respondents are more likely to think that CNN articles about
President Trump contain false claims, more likely to think that CNN generally makes false
claims in its political reporting, and more likely to think that CNN publishes stories about
President Trump based on unverified and potentially misleading sources. The treatment
also affects more general perceptions of CNN: Treated respondents display lower trust
in CNN, think its news articles are of lower quality, and think it is more likely to be
politically biased. Given these results, the more-information-is-better principle predicts a
strict decrease in the demand for news from CNN. The main result from this experiment is
that despite a strong first stage on perceptions of false claims by CNN, treated respondents
1All information presented to the respondents was truthful. For more background, see the following
article in Associated Press News: https://www.apnews.com/b432a20d85ca48a5bca6c3394920c7fe
(accessed October 2, 2019) and our discussion in Section 4.
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do not reduce their demand for news from CNN.
Taken together, the results from the two main experiments suggest that some of the
motivations people have to read news directly conflict with the desire for more information.
One such motive could be a preference for belief confirmation (Mullainathan and Shleifer,
2005), which leads people to avoid news that is less likely to confirm their prior beliefs. A
second such motive could be a desire for entertainment, which could lead people to seek
news that are more likely to contain extreme and surprising facts (Ely et al., 2015)—even
if the underlying facts are less likely to be true.
Our results contribute to the literature on media bias (DellaVigna and Ferrara, 2015;
DellaVigna and Hermle, 2017; Gentzkow et al., 2018; Jo, 2019; Mullainathan and Shleifer,
2005; Perego and Yuksel, 2018; Pogorelskiy and Shum, 2019; Qin et al., 2018; Szeidl and
Szucs, 2017) and fake news (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017; Lazer et al., 2018; Vosoughi et
al., 2018). The focus of this literature has largely been on the supply side of media bias
(Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006, 2010; Gentzkow et al., 2014) or the persuasive effect of
biased news on voting decisions (DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007; Enikolopov et al., 2011),
and there is only indirect evidence on the demand side. A common approach for studying
the demand side of media bias is to use aggregate data on news demand and examine
how different political groups adjust their demand for news in response to changes in
media bias (Durante and Knight, 2012; Garz et al., 2018; Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2010).
These studies are consistent with people having other motives to read news that conflict
with their desire for more information, such as a preference for like-minded news, but
are also consistent with standard preferences and unobserved differences in the perceived
informativeness of news. To reject that people have standard preferences as in Gentzkow
and Shapiro (2006), these studies therefore require model-based identification assuming
that people do not change their beliefs about the informativeness or quality of news in
response to changes in media bias. The main contribution of this paper is to provide the
first direct evidence on whether the desire for more information dominates other motives
to read news. Our main results—that respondents who think that a newspaper is less likely
to suppress information reduce their demand for news and that respondents who think that
5
a news outlet is more likely to make false claims do not reduce their demand—cannot be
rationalized with standard preferences that would imply a demand for more informative
news.
Furthermore, we also contribute to a small but growing literature on people’s demand
for information and information avoidance (Charness et al., 2019; Falk and Zimmermann,
2017; Ganguly and Tasoff, 2016; Golman et al., 2017; Nielsen, 2019; Zimmermann,
2015).2 Studying the demand for more informative news is of particular importance
because of the political externalities of news consumption, including its effects on political
accountability, electoral efficiency, and political polarization (Strömberg, 2015; Sunstein,
2018). Understanding whether people demand more informative news is also of critical
importance for the debate on whether policy makers should introduce regulations to
increase competition in media markets (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006; Mullainathan and
Shleifer, 2005). Our key contribution to this literature is thus to provide clean evidence
on information avoidance in the context of news consumption. To identify information
avoidance, we employ a new identification strategy by varying perceptions about the
accuracy of the signal provided by a news outlet.3 In contrast to much of the previous
experimental literature on information avoidance, we vary perceptions about a real-world
source rather than features of an artificial lab environment.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a simple theoretical
framework that formalizes the more-information-is-better principle and relates it to our
main experimental design. Section 3 covers the main experiment on strategic suppression
of information in the New York Times in addition to several robustness and mechanisms
experiments. Section 4 covers the second main experiment on false claims in CNN.
Section 5 discusses the implications of our findings for models of news consumption.
Section 6 concludes and discusses implications for the regulation of media markets. The
Online Appendix provides additional theoretical and empirical results and the full set of
2More broadly our evidence relates to a relatively large literature on motivated belief updating (Exley,
2015; Exley and Kessler, 2018; Schwardmann and van der Weele, 2019; Di Tella et al., 2015; Thaler, 2019).
3We thus also contribute to a literature on information provision experiments. For a review of this
literature, see Haaland et al. (2020).
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experimental instructions.
2 Theoretical framework: Filtering
We now present a simple framework that formalizes the implications of strategic infor-
mation suppression of news outlets for the Blackwell informativeness of news in our
empirical design. This provides us with a theoretical benchmark for how learning that a
newspaper is less likely to strategically suppress information should affect the demand for
news according to the more-information-is-better principle.
There is a binary state space Θ = {L,R} with a typical element denoted by θ and
an agent with prior belief q ∈ ∆(Θ) about the hidden state. The agent has the option
to acquire information from a newspaper. The newspaper provides information about
θ by publishing an article n ∈ N whose content is revealed only upon acquiring it. To
introduce scope for information suppression, we assume that the newspaper receives a
set of private signals s = {s1, . . . ,sK} ∈ S from its information source. The set consists of
K binary bits of information si ∈Θ about the state of the world θ , where K is randomly
drawn and independent of θ . The individual bits, si, are drawn from a state-dependent
distribution, Fθ . We assume that FL places higher weight on L compared to FR, implying
that si is informative about θ . The source signal can thus be represented as an information
structure (S,pi) with state-dependent likelihood pi : Θ→ ∆(S). In our main empirical
design, the CBO is the newspaper’s source, providing two conflicting bits s= {L,R} about
the desirability, θ , of the Trump Healthcare Plan.
The newspaper can disclose any subset of s in its article n, i.e. n⊆ s, implying that it
cannot distort individual bits. Information suppression occurs whenever n 6= s. We are
agnostic about the newspaper’s incentives to suppress information, subsuming them in the
reader’s belief ρ : S→ ∆(N) about how the newspaper reports conditional on s.
From the agent’s perspective, the informativeness of an article n should be an invariant
of the state-dependent distribution over news articles, σ : Θ→ ∆(N), induced by the
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agent’s belief about the quality of the newspaper’s source, pi , and the belief about how
the newspaper reports, ρ . Specifically, consider two articles n and n′ with distributions
σ ,σ ′ : Θ→ ∆(N). We use Blackwell’s (1951) notion of informativeness and say that n is
(Blackwell) more informative than n′ if (n,σ) is sufficient for (n′,σ ′), that is: there is a
stochastic transformation τ such that n′ and τ(n) are identically distributed. Intuitively, we
obtain n′ by adding noise to n. This is the benchmark for evaluating the informativeness
of an information structure: any agent with access to an article n that is more informative
than n′ can attain an expected payoff at least as large as the maximal expected payoff
attainable with n′, regardless of the prior q and the decision problem a ∈ A with payoffs
u(a,θ) (Blackwell, 1953). This provides the prediction that the demand for news should
be strictly increasing in the perceived informativeness of the news.
How does strategic suppression affect the informativeness of news? Suppose the
newspaper received the signals s = {s1, . . . ,sK} and let σ(s′ | s) denote the agents’ belief
that the newspaper would report s′ ⊆ s after receiving s. Intuitively, the informativeness of
the article n should be increasing in the probability of fully conveying the signal. Indeed,
the Blackwell informativeness of an article strictly increases if we decrease the probability
σ(s′ | s) of reporting a filtered signal s′ ( s and instead increase the probability of full
information transmission, σ(s | s).4
This provides us with an empirical test of the more-information-is-better principle.
Specifically, we leverage an information treatment that decreases respondents’ expectation
that the New York Times strategically filters information from CBO reports and increases
their expectation that the New York Times reveals all information from the report. By the
previous discussion, treated respondents should perceive articles from the New York Times
as more informative, especially for articles covering reports from the CBO. If the desire for
more information is the dominant motive for economic and political news consumption,
the theoretical benchmark prediction is that treated respondents should strictly increase
their demand for news. However, if motives that conflict with becoming better informed
dominate this desire, we would expect the demand to decrease (Mullainathan and Shleifer,
4See Proposition 1 in the Online Appendix for a proof.
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2005).
3 Filtering experiment
3.1 Sample
We collected the data for the main filtering experiment in three waves in collaboration with
Dynata, formerly called Research Now SSI, a leading market research company commonly
used in social science research (de Quidt et al., 2018; Enke, 2020). We have a sample
of 4,631 respondents that is broadly representative of the U.S. population in terms of
education, age, income, region, gender and political affiliation (column 1 of Table C.1).
The treatment and control group are balanced in terms of observable characteristics
(Table C.2).
3.2 Experimental design
This section outlines our experimental design. Figure 1 provides a summary of the structure
and Section E of the Online Appendix provides the full experimental instructions.
Pre-treatment characteristics and beliefs We first measure basic demographics, namely
income, age, gender, and region of residence. Furthermore, we ask for people’s political
preferences and beliefs, how often they read the New York Times, and the three newspapers
they are most likely to read. Thereafter, we elicit people’s beliefs about how the New
York Times reports about the Trump Healthcare Plan. Specifically, we tell our respondents
that the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Congress’ official nonpartisan provider of
cost and benefit estimates for legislation, published a report about the Trump Healthcare
Plan(the American Health Care Act of 2017). Respondents are told that the CBO estimated
that the plan would decrease the federal deficit by $119 billion (contradicting claims made
by Democrats) and leave 23 million more people uninsured (contradicting claims made by
Republicans). Subsequently, we measure respondents’ beliefs about how the New York
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Times covered the CBO report by asking our respondents to estimate the percent chance
that the New York Times reported only the figure on the number of uninsured people, only
the figure on the deficit decrease, or both figures.
We chose to focus on the New York Times for two main reasons. First, the New York Times
is a well-known newspaper with a national coverage. Second, it tends to lean toward the
Democratic Party (for instance, it has consistently supported Democratic candidates for
president since 1960). Choosing a newspaper with a clear partisan stance ensures that
beliefs about political reporting of the newspapers are shifted in the same direction for
the majority of respondents. Furthermore, we focused on the New York Times’s reporting
strategy about news from the CBO for the following reasons: First, the CBO is Congress’s
official provider of cost and benefit estimates for legislation and is known to be nonpartisan
(to stay politically neutral, it only assesses the consequences of proposed policies and
does not make its own policy recommendations). Second, all major newspapers in the U.S.
generally feature CBO reports in their news reporting.
Information treatment We provide a random subset of respondents with information
about the New York Times (treatment group).5 Specifically, we provide treated respondents
with the following information treatment, which is framed in a neutral way to minimize
experimenter demand effects:
In its article about the CBO estimates, The New York Times reported both
that the federal budget deficit would decrease by $119 billion and that the
number of people without health insurance would increase by 23 million.
Respondents in the control group proceed without receiving any information.
Post-treatment outcomes To mitigate concerns about consistency bias in survey re-
sponse (Falk and Zimmermann, 2012), a subset of respondents of Experiment 1.1 are
5We stratify the assignment into treatment and control group by whether respondents identify as
Republicans, Democrats, or Independents.
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cross-randomized to receive either (i) a question on the demand for news (2,250 respon-
dents) or (ii) the post-treatment beliefs block (755 respondents).6 In all other experiments,
all respondents proceed to the question on demand for news.
Main outcome: Article demand We collect a behavioral outcome measure on people’s
demand for news by providing them with an opportunity to read an article from the New
York Times. This article is unrelated to the Trump Healthcare Plan and instead covers a
CBO report about a different policy: the Trump Tax Plan. However, we do not provide any
additional information about the content of the article or the corresponding CBO evaluation
of the Trump Tax Plan. We make this distinction salient to respondents, thus ensuring
that respondents expect to receive an article containing new information not previously
mentioned in the survey. Specifically, we tell respondents that the CBO analyzed the
consequences of the Trump Tax Plan over the next decade and ask them whether they
want to read an article about its findings in New York Times. We tell respondents that if
they decide not to receive access to the article, they will proceed with the survey without
receiving access to the article. If they decide to receive access to the article, they will
receive access at the end of the survey. We thus decrease the cost of accessing the New
York Times article both in terms of search costs and in terms of avoiding the New York
Times paywall.7
There are several reasons why we choose this as our main outcome. First, the decision
on whether or not to read a real news article in the New York Times has high external
validity as most online news consumption decisions are low stakes in nature. Second, our
setting allows us to hold some beliefs about article characteristics across the treatment
and control group constant. For instance, to fix perceptions of cognitive effort required to
read the article across treatment arms, we directly tell respondents that the article contains
about 1,100 words. Third, by embedding the article in our online survey, we can measure
6The main experiment was conducted in three waves. We only cross-randomized respondents into the
beliefs block in the second wave. See Table 1 for more details.
7While the New York Times is technically behind a paywall, it offers non-subscribers free access to 10
articles per month. If our respondents were perfectly aware of this, they could thus save one of their 10 free
articles if they decided to receive access through our survey rather than visiting the New York Times directly.
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not only the extensive margin, that is, whether people want to read the news article, but
also the intensive margin, that is, how much time they spend reading the news article.
Post-treatment belief I: Filtering To study whether our treatment intervention affected
people’s beliefs about informativeness, we collect a post-treatment measure of strategic
information suppression, but only for the subset of respondents who were randomized not
to receive the demand for news block. To do so, we provide respondents with information
about cost and benefit estimates from a CBO report regarding the Trump Tax Plan. We tell
respondents about the opposing predictions made by Republicans and Democrats about
the plan’s impact on the federal debt and job creation. To avoid consistency bias in survey
responses, we employ a different way of measuring beliefs about information suppression
compared to the elicitation of prior beliefs. We inform respondents that the New York
Times reported that the Trump Tax Plan would increase the federal debt as claimed by
Democrats. We then ask our respondents to estimate the percent chance that the New York
Times also reported that the Trump Tax Plan would create 1.1 million jobs.
Post-treatment belief II: Omission Furthermore, we measure beliefs about the exten-
sive margin of political news coverage by eliciting people’s beliefs about whether the New
York Times strategically decides not to publish articles about certain CBO reports. This
allows us to test for treatment effects on beliefs about news coverage that are conceptually
distinct from within-article filtering of information. Specifically, we ask respondents to
estimate the percent chance that the New York Times wrote any article at all about a CBO
report estimating that a signature policy proposed by Democrats would add $27 billion
to the federal debt. This signature policy would grant citizenship status to 1.8 million
young undocumented immigrants (known as the Dreamers), and we inform respondents
that Democrats claimed that it would not increase the federal debt.
Post-treatment beliefs III: Article characteristics We also measure additional beliefs
about (i) the quality of news articles in the New York Times, (ii) whether the New York
12
Times article about the Trump Tax Plan will be dry and technical, and (iii) whether the
article about the Trump Tax Plan will be complex.
Additional beliefs and demographics We also separately elicit people’s perception of
whether the New York Times and the CBO are politically biased, their trust in the New York
Times and the CBO, and general trust in the media. Furthermore, we measure beliefs about
the accuracy of CBO forecasts. Finally, we ask some additional demographic questions.
3.3 Main results
In this section, we study the causal effect of learning that a newspaper is less likely to
suppress information on beliefs and demand for news.
3.3.1 Empirical specification
Our main empirical specification for different outcomes, yi, is given as follows:
yi = α0+α1Ti+α2xi+ εi (1)
where Ti is an indicator for whether subject i received the information treatment; xi is a
vector of controls8; and εi is an individual-specific error term. We use robust error terms
for inference. yi is the outcome variable of interest.
3.3.2 Post-treatment beliefs about reporting
We provide evidence that treated respondents expect more informative news reports from
the New York Times and hold more favorable views of the newspaper. First, treated
8We use the following pre-specified controls: gender (male indicator), age (continuous), log income
(continuous), region (three indicators), race (white indicator), education (college indicator), employment
status (indicator for full-time work), frequency of reading the New York Times (continuous, elicited pre-
treatment), beliefs about the consequences of the Trump Tax Plan and the Trump Healthcare Plan (both
continuous and elicited pre-treatment), pre-treatment beliefs about the probability that the New York Times
would report unbiasedly, and experiment fixed effects (two indicators). We also have a few respondents in
the sample who did not complete all demographic questions; we include indicators for missing values for
these respondents.
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respondents positively update about the informativeness of the newspaper as they think
it is 6.8 percentage points more likely that the New York Times does not suppress any
information about the CBO report on the Trump Tax Plan (p < 0.01, column 1 of Table 2).
Second, column 2 provides suggestive evidence that the treatment also affects beliefs
about the extensive margin of news coverage: Treated respondents are 3.3 percentage
points more likely to think that the New York Times covers a CBO report which contradicts
claims by Democrats that granting citizenship status to undocumented immigrants would
not have negative fiscal consequences. However, this effect is not statistically significant
at conventional levels. Third, treated respondents are 4.1 percentage points more likely
to think that the New York Times is not politically biased (p < 0.01, column 6). This
provides indirect evidence that people perceive the article containing both statistics as
more balanced. Finally, perceived quality of New York Times articles is 10.3 percent
of a standard deviation higher among treated respondents (p < 0.10, column 3). Taken
together, treated respondents think that the New York Times provides more information, is
less politically biased and writes higher quality articles. Any of these beliefs should imply
a subsequent increase in demand for news in rational models of information demand.
[Insert Table 2 here]
3.3.3 Treatment effects on demand for news
Our main object of interest is people’s demand for news, which takes value one if our
respondents want free access to the news story about the Trump Tax Plan and zero
otherwise. The main finding of this paper is that respondents who learn that the New York
Times is more informative than they thought reduce their demand for news. Column 1 of
Table 3 highlights that treated respondents on average significantly reduce their demand
for news by 3.5 percentage points. This corresponds to a reduction in the demand for news
of approximately 13 percent, i.e. one third of the control group difference in demand for
reading the article between Republicans and Democrats.9 A comparison of the treatment
9The baseline demand for news of 27.4 percent in the control group reflects people’s opportunity cost
of reading the article and is in itself not indicative of a violation of the more information is better principle.
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effect with the magnitude of the first-stage—i.e., the 6.8 percentage point increase in the
perceived likelihood that the New York Times does not suppress information—suggests that
people’s demand for news is relatively elastic to changes in perceptions of informativeness.
The median time spent reading the article about the Trump Tax Plan is 66 seconds,
suggesting that a substantial fraction of our respondents read at least some parts of the
article.10 The time spent reading the article does not vary significantly across treatment
arms, indicating that the treatment did not affect how carefully people read the article.
[Insert Table 3 here]
3.3.4 Preference for belief confirmation and news demand
The negative treatment effect on demand for news is inconsistent with people being
rational unbiased readers who only seek news to get information. One mechanism that
potentially explains the negative treatment effect is that people get disutility from reading
news inconsistent with their prior beliefs (Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005). If our
respondents generally believe that the New York Times slants to the left, a preference for
belief confirmation predicts a clear polarization in news consumption between Democrats
and Republicans. However, as shown in Figure B.1, there is substantial heterogeneity in
beliefs about whether the New York Times slants to the right or left. This heterogeneity
makes it necessary to take prior beliefs into account when testing predictions based on a
preference for belief confirmation.
Furthermore, while party affiliation strongly predicts people’s beliefs about the Trump
Tax Plan, a substantial fraction of both Republicans and Democrats hold beliefs that
differ from their own political party (as shown in Figure B.2). Since people might receive
disutility from reading news inconsistent with their own beliefs as well as news inconsistent
with claims made by their political party, it is not clear what we should predict when
people hold divergent beliefs from claims made by their own political party. To examine
whether the main result from Experiment 1.1 is consistent with a preference for belief
10Reading the full article takes between four and five minutes.
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confirmation, we therefore focus on respondents with party-consistent beliefs and estimate
treatment effects separately for Democrats and Republicans.11
Among Democrats, we observe a general decrease in the demand for news by 3.2
percentage points (column 1 of Table C.4). Consistent with predictions based on a
preference for belief confirmation, we observe a negative but non-significant interaction
effect between the treatment and beliefs about left-wing slant (column 2 of Table C.4). To
allow for a more flexible heterogeneity analysis, we also examine heterogeneous treatment
effects based on a nonparametric kernel smoothing estimator (Hainmueller et al., 2019).
As shown in Panel A of Figure B.4, there is a U-shaped pattern in the heterogeneous
responses: Democrats who think the New York Times is quite likely to slant to the left
significantly reduce their demand for news in response to the information, but there is no
response among respondents with more extreme beliefs in either direction. This U-shaped
pattern is consistent with a preference for belief confirmation. As we show in Section A.2
of the Online Appendix, a simple model predicts that people with more extreme beliefs are
less likely to be marginal, implying a non-monotonic relationship between pre-treatment
beliefs and news demand. The intuition behind this observation is that respondents who
are predicted to receive the largest negative changes in consumption utility had higher
expected utility from reading the article to begin with.
However, as shown in column 3 of Table C.4, we also see a negative non-significant
interaction effect between the treatment and pre-treatment beliefs about right-wing slant.
The negative sign of the interaction effect is clearly not consistent with a preference for
belief confirmation. As shown in Panel B of B.4, the negative point estimate is generally
driven by Democrats who believe that the New York Times is very likely to slant to the right.
However, the effect for this subgroup is imprecisely estimated as very few Democrats
believe that the New York Times slants to the right.
For Republicans, we observe a general decrease in the demand for news by 4 percent-
age points (column 5 of Table C.4). There is essentially no treatment heterogeneity by
11I.e., we exclude Democrats who think that the plan has overall positive consequences and Republicans
who think it has overall negative consequences from the regressions. The regressions include Independents
who lean toward the Democratic Party or the Republican Party.
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beliefs about left-wing slant (column 6 of Table C.4 and Panel C of Figure B.4). Assuming
that news demand is elastic to changes in beliefs for all respondents, a preference for belief
confirmation would predict a strict increase in demand among Republicans who thought
the New York Times was very likely to slant to the left. On the other hand, consistent
with a preference for belief confirmation, we observe a strong and statistically significant
negative interaction effect between the treatment and pre-treatment and beliefs right-wing
slant (column 7). The nonparametric analysis shows that the reduction in demand among
Republicans is driven by respondents who initially believed that the New York Times was
very likely to be right-wing biased (Panel D of Figure B.4)
To conclude, the heterogeneity analysis does not provide very conclusive evidence
either in favor or against the relevance of a preference for belief confirmation in driving
our negative treatment effect. Consistent with a preference for belief confirmation, the
negative treatment effect is broadly driven by respondents who learn that the New York
Times is less likely to confirm their prior beliefs. On the other hand, we do not observe a
similar increase in demand for news among respondents who learn that the New York Times
is less likely to only report statistics that contradict their beliefs. However, if respondents
have a very strong preference for belief confirmation and are thus motivated to avoid
articles that contain any information that conflicts with their prior beliefs, it is not clear
that these respondents should increase their demand in response to the information.
3.3.5 Article spin
We also provide evidence on how the demand for news responds to more subtle forms of
media bias, such as “spin,” namely newspapers’ tendency to systematically emphasize facts
that favor a particular interpretation of an event. We conducted an additional experiment
where we manipulate respondents’ beliefs about the facts emphasized in the headline of
an article in the New York Times to study whether perceptions of spin also generate belief-
based utility motives for reading news. In this experiment, we provide some respondents
with information highlighting that the New York Times slanted a news report to the left. In
line with people having a preference for belief confirmation, the treatment significantly
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polarizes news consumption between those who, in light of their prior beliefs and political
affiliation, anticipate their beliefs to be confirmed or to be challenged by the New York
Times article. We provide details on the design and results from this experiment in Section
D of the Online Appendix.
3.4 Discussion of alternative explanations
One explanation for our main finding that respondents reduce their demand for news that
they perceive as more informative is that people have a preference for belief confirmation
that sometimes dominates people’s desire for more information. It could also be case that
people perceive more informative news as less entertaining, explaining why we generally
see a decrease in the demand for news across different subgroups.
We now provide evidence against a series of potential alternative mechanisms. We first
discuss behavioral explanations based on cognitive constraints, curiosity, and experimenter
demand effects. We then discuss rational explanations based on beliefs about quality,
diversification of news sources, and delegation incentives for filtering. Finally, we provide
evidence that our results are robust to various changes in the experimental design.
3.4.1 Behavioral explanations
Cognitive constraints The more-information-is-better principle might not hold in our
setting if the marginal cognitive cost of processing one additional statistic from a CBO
report exceeds the expected informational value from the additional statistic. Our main
finding could then be driven by treated respondents who expect the article about the Trump
Tax Plan to contain too much statistical information to justify the cognitive cost of reading
the article.
To assess whether cognitive constraints are likely to drive our main result, we conduct
a placebo experiment in collaboration with Dynata (Experiment 1.3, n = 930; see Table 1).
As in the main experiment (Experiment 1.1), we inform respondents that the CBO analyzed
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the impact of the Trump Healthcare Plan.12 We then inform respondents that the CBO
highlighted two key statistics in its report and that the New York Times subsequently
wrote an article about the report. However, in contrast to the main experiment, we do
not tell respondents what the statistics are about. We then ask our respondents to state
the percent chance they assign to the New York Times citing zero, one, or two of these
two key statistics from the report. To exogenously vary beliefs about how many statistics
the New York Times is likely to mention from CBO reports, we inform a random subset
of respondents that the New York Times reported both key statistics in its coverage of
the Trump Healthcare Plan. We then measure demand for news exactly as in the main
experiment by asking respondents whether they want free access to an article in the New
York Times about the Trump Tax Plan. In this neutral setting, people do not reduce their
demand for news when learning that the New York Times provides more informative
news. If anything, the treatment increases people’s demand for news by 1.5 percentage
points (column 1 of Table C.7)—the opposite of the prediction of the cognitive constraints
account.
Explanations based on cognitive constraints are also inconsistent with several patterns
in the data from the main experiment. First, if we use educational attainment as a proxy
for cognitive costs with respondents, we do not find any statistically significant differences
in treatment effects for people with low or high cognitive costs (column 2 of Table C.5).
Second, for respondents who were cross-randomized into not being offered free access to
the article, we collected a series of post-treatment measures related to perceived cognitive
costs of reading the article about the Trump Tax Plan. Respondents in the treatment group
think the article about the Trump Tax Plan would be equally complex, dry and technical
as respondents in the control group (columns 4 and 5 of Table 2).
Curiosity In the main experiment (Experiment 1.1), we elicit pre-treatment beliefs about
suppression of information in the New York Times and only inform treated respondents
about whether it actually suppressed information. This creates two potential curiosity mo-
12In this experiment, we used the term “GOP Health Bill” instead of “Trump Healthcare Plan.”
19
tives that could differ between the treatment and control group. First, treated respondents
might be curious about whether the information we provided was accurate and perceive
the article about the Trump Tax Plan as a chance to validate the information, thereby
increasing demand relative to the control group. Second, control group respondents might
be curious to learn whether or not the New York Times tends to suppress information from
CBO reports and view the article about the Trump Tax Plan as an opportunity to learn
about this, thereby increasing demand relative to the treatment group. However, it is worth
emphasizing that learning about whether the New York Times suppressed information from
the Trump Tax Plan is not straightforward as it would require both reading the published
article in the New York Times as well as retrieving and reading the original CBO report
about the Trump Tax Plan.13 The net directional effect of the two curiosity motives is
difficult to predict since they work in opposite directions, but curiosity could potentially
explain our negative main effect if the motive is present and stronger in the control group.
To address concerns about curiosity, we conducted an additional experiment on a
broadly representative sample recruited in collaboration with Lucid (n = 3,189, Experi-
ment 1.2; see Table 1).14 In this experiment, we tell all respondents that we will ask them
a question about how the New York Times covered the findings from a CBO report and
highlight the following text in bold: “We will tell you how The New York Times covered
these findings at some later point in the survey” (Section E.2.2 in the Online Appendix
provides a screenshot). If control respondents were curious to find out whether the New
York Times tends to suppress information from CBO reports, they would no longer have
an extra incentive to read the article to find out.15 As column 2 of Table 3 illustrates, we
find a quantitatively similar effect size in this experiment (if anything, we uncover a larger
treatment effect than in the main experiment)—suggesting a limited role for curiosity in
driving the treatment effects.16
13Our respondents do not receive any information about the CBO report about the Trump Tax Plan.
14Lucid is a survey provider commonly used in social science research (Wood and Porter, 2019).
15Expected learning about biases in reporting is thus constant across the treatment and control group,
and learning about any possible bias in the second article would again require respondents to read both the
article and the underlying CBO report.
16As we discuss in Section 3.4.3 on robustness of design choices, this experiment also used different
articles from the main experiment to elicit beliefs and article demand.
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Several patterns in the data from the other experiments are also inconsistent with a
strong curiosity motive driving the negative treatment effect on demand for news. First,
in the main experiment (Experiment 1.1), we collected a post-treatment measure on
how interested people were in learning whether the New York Times “reports unbiasedly
about political issues.” Column 8 of Table 2 shows that treated respondents are not
more curious to learn about this. The effect is close to zero and relatively precisely
estimated. Second, curiosity motives might also be present in the placebo experiment
(Experiment 1.3; see Table 1) in which we measure people’s beliefs about whether the New
York Times suppressed any key statistics from a CBO report without giving respondents
any information about what the statistics were. Instead of being curious about bias in
reporting, respondents in the control group might be curious to learn how much statistical
information the New York Times tends to report. However, we find, if anything, that the
treatment increases people’s demand for news—inconsistent with the predictions of the
curiosity motive (column 1 of Table C.7).
Experimenter demand effects It is possible that treated respondents form different
beliefs about the experimenter’s expectations compared to control group respondents.
However, we do not believe that experimenter demand is a major concern in our setting:
First, it seems more likely that learning that a newspaper provides more informative news
should create the expectation that demand for news should be increased—the opposite of
what we find. Additionally, the treatment was framed in a neutral way specifically to avoid
concerns about experimenter demand effects. Second, we do not observe a decline in the
demand for news in the placebo experiment (see p. 18 for a description) where we also
inform people that the New York Times provides more information. Third, recent evidence
suggests that experimental subjects respond only moderately to explicit signals about the
experimenter’s expectations, indicating a limited quantitative importance of experimenter
demand effects (de Quidt et al., 2018; Mummolo and Peterson, 2018).
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3.4.2 Rational explanations
Trust and quality In the context of news consumption, a theoretically important ex-
planation is based on Bayesian updating about the quality of the New York Times and
its information sources. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) show that if there is uncertainty
about both the state of the world and the quality of a newspaper, a Bayesian consumer
will update negatively about the quality of the newspaper after reading an article that
conflicts with his prior belief about the state of the world. While this exact mechanism
cannot explain our main result since we keep the source of the information constant across
articles, the treatment may still affect people’s evaluation of the New York Times along the
quality dimension. We therefore collect a battery of post-treatment measures of quality
as well as on trust and political bias. Empirically, treated respondents are more likely to
say the New York Times provides high-quality articles (column 3 of Table 2) and display
identical levels of trust in the New York Times (columns 7). There are no obvious reasons
why our treatment should affect beliefs about the CBO. In line with this, we find no
treatment effect on respondents’ perceptions of the political bias of the CBO (column 9)
or their level of trust in the CBO (column 10). Rather, respondents do update positively
about the accuracy of the CBO (column 11). This effect in isolation should increase the
demand for news about the CBO if people want more informative news, the opposite of
what we find.
Diversification Another potential explanation is based on the idea that people might
consume a diverse set of news articles to extract a more informative signal by combining
the different pieces of information (Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005).17 Accordingly, a
newspaper is particularly valuable if it provides information that is complementary to the
information contained in the consumer’s news portfolio. Our treatment might then reduce
the value of the New York Times in balancing out right-leaning news sources because it is
perceived as more even-handed.
17This portfolio motive hinges on people’s perceived ability to debias themselves. However, empirical
evidence suggests that it may be difficult for people to fully debias themselves (Enke, 2019).
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We asked people pre-treatment to list up to three newspapers they are likely to read
from a list of 20 popular newspapers across the political spectrum. For 46 percent of our
respondents, the diversification motive is not present as they selected only left-leaning or
right-leaning newspapers. Moreover, treatment effects are similar for respondents that
only consume newspapers on one side of the political spectrum compared to those who
read both at least one left-wing newspaper and one right-wing newspaper (column 1 of
Table C.5).
Delegation Consumers delegate costly information acquisition to newspapers. If demand-
side or supply-side constraints limit newspapers’ ability to communicate all the information
available to them, Suen (2004) and Chan and Suen (2008) show that it can be rational for
consumers to have a demand for articles that primarily contain information that confirm
their prior beliefs. Delegation incentives are psychologically different from a behavioral
preference for belief confirmation, but make similar predictions.
We think that delegation incentives do not drive our treatment effects. First, supply-
side constraints are unlikely given that all major newspapers reported both findings.18
Moreover, all respondents were informed that the New York Times’s article contains 1,100
words, which is sufficient to discuss all key results from CBO reports. Second, our
placebo experiment provides evidence against demand-side constraints based on cognitive
constraints (see p. 18 for the discussion). Third, one implication of delegation is that
people from different political groups may have differential demand for different pieces
of information. In an additional experiment, we test empirically whether Democrats and
Republicans exhibit such patterns of differential demand with data from a representative
online panel in which we measure people’s demand for learning about the CBO estimates
about the Trump Healthcare Plan and the Trump Tax Plan (Experiment 1.4; see Table 1).
We find no differential demand for different pieces of information within each political
group (as shown in Figure B.6).
18We verified that all top 15 newspapers by circulation (as of June 2019) reported both findings.
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3.4.3 Robustness
We also conducted additional experiments using samples from Lucid (Experiment 1.2)
and Amazon Mechanical Turk (Experiment 1.5, 1.6, and 1.7) to assess the robustness of
our results (Table 1 provides an overview of all experiments).
Article choice and monetary incentives We first assess the robustness of our main
result to a different choice of articles. In Experiment 1.2 with Lucid (n = 3,189; see
Table 1) we use two new CBO reports to elicit beliefs about information suppression and
measure article demand.19 To elicit beliefs about information suppression, we rely on
a CBO report about the consequences of “Democrats’ $15 Minimum Wage Bill” (the
Raise the Wage Act, a Democratic bill to to raise the federal minimum wage to $15).
Respondents are told that the CBO estimated that the bill would lift 1.3 million people out
of poverty (contradicting claims made by Republicans) and decrease the number of jobs by
1.3 million (contradicting claims made by Democrats). To measure article demand after an
information treatment in which respondents are informed that the New York Times reported
both statistics, we offer all respondents free access to an article in the New York Times
covering a CBO report about the consequences of establishing a single-payer health care
system. As shown in column 2 of Table 3, demand for news declines by 4.7 percentage
points in this experiment (p < 0.01), confirming that our main result is robust to using
different articles.
In an experiment on Amazon Mechanical Turk (Experiment 1.6, n = 723), conducted
with Democrats and Democrat-leaning Independents, we reverse the order of articles used
in Experiment 1.1. Furthermore, in this experiment, we elicit pre-treatment beliefs about
how the New York Times covered the findings from the CBO report about the Trump Tax
Plan using monetary incentives and a quadratic scoring rule.20 We subsequently measure
people’s demand for the article about the CBO evaluation of the Trump Healthcare Plan.
The patterns of beliefs and treatment effects are very similar to those in our main filtering
19In this experiment, we also address concerns about curiosity as discussed on page 19.
20We randomly selected one in ten respondents to be paid up to $1 according to their guess.
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experiment (column 1 of Table C.6), suggesting that monetary incentives and reversed
article order do not substantially affect our results.21
Platform Across the experiments, we recruit respondents from three different platforms:
Dynata, Lucid, and Amazon Mechanical Turk. These platforms are extensively used in
social science research.22 Table 3 shows that the main treatment effect on demand for news
is very stable across platforms, which includes an experiment on Amazon Mechanical Turk
with an identical design as the main experiment (Experiment 1.7; n = 1,332). If anything,
the estimated treatment effects are larger in our experiment using a representative sample
from Lucid (column 2) and in our experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk (column 3).
External validity We conducted an additional experiment on Amazon Mechanical Turk
(Experiment 1.5; n = 199) in which we assess the external validity of our behavioral
measure of article demand. Specifically, we measure in randomized order both people’s
demand for news and (incentivized) willingness to pay for a 3-month subscription to
the New York Times using a multiple price list.23 We find that our measure of article
demand is significantly correlated with people’s willingness to pay (ρ = 0.298, p < 0.01).
Despite being a binary variable, article demand has greater explanatory power for people’s
willingness to pay compared to a saturated regression controlling for political affiliation,
gender, income, and people’s beliefs about how the New York Times covered a CBO report.
21The point estimate of -0.04 is very close to the change in the demand for news in the main filtering
experiment of -0.035, but would require larger samples to be statistically significant.
22Coppock and McClellan (2019) find that samples from Lucid score similarly to the American National
Election Study’s (ANES) on the Big-5 personality inventory, show similar levels of political knowledge, and
recover framing effects similar to the ones observed in the General Social Survey. Horton et al. (2011) find
that experiments on MTurk closely replicate results from traditional lab experiments.
23Respondents decide between varying amounts of U.S. dollars and a subscription to the New York Times.
We informed respondents that one out of ten randomly chosen participants would get one of their choices
implemented. We used the following monetary amounts: 50 cents, $1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $10. Screenshots of
the willingness to pay elicitation are provided in Section E.5.
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4 False claims experiment
This section provides another test of the more-information-is-better principle by studying
how perceptions of false claims affect the demand for news. The design complements
the main experiment by changing perceptions of a different source of informativeness.
Conceptually, changing perceptions of false claims amounts to changing beliefs about the
noise in the signal reported by a news outlet. The more-information-is-better principle
predicts that the demand for news should strictly decrease in the perceived level of noise.
4.1 Theoretical framework: False claims
We briefly formalize how false claims by news outlets affect the informativeness of news,
which provides us with a theoretical benchmark for our treatment effect. Motivated
by the empirical challenge to disentangle genuine mistakes from intentional distortion,
we adopt a reduced-form perspective and directly focus on the agent’s belief about the
state-dependent distribution σ :Θ→ ∆(N) over news articles.
The newspaper is constrained to binary messages n ∈ {L,R} about the binary state
θ ∈ Θ. The probability of reporting n = R in state θ is σθ for each θ ∈ Θ. Specifically,
σR is the likelihood of a correct report in state R, while σL represents the likelihood of a
false claim in state L. Intuitively, an agent should thus prefer larger σR and smaller σL if
his objective is to learn about the truth. Assume that σL < σR, i.e. the newspaper is more
likely to report n = R if the state is R instead of L.24
Consider two distributions over articles given by σ = (σL,σR) and σ ′ = (σ ′L,σR)
where σL < σ ′L < σR. An article n from the distribution σ is Blackwell more informative
than an article n′ from the distribution σ ′.25 Intuitively, we obtain σ ′ by adding noise
to σ in state L, thereby reducing its informativeness. This suggests a second empirical
test of whether people value more informative news that is independent of people’s prior
24This is without loss of generality because the article is completely uninformative if σL = σR, and we
can relabel the articles if σL > σR.
25See Proposition 2 in the Online Appendix for a proof.
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beliefs by inducing exogenous variation in the level of noise. In our experimental design,
we exogenously increase treated respondents’ perceived likelihood that CNN makes false
claims in its political reporting. Theoretically, this should decrease the demand for news
irrespective of whether these changes in perceived informativeness arise from people
updating about the degree of distortion by CNN or about the likelihood of making a
mistake in its reporting.
4.2 Experimental design and results
Design and sample We collected data for the experiment in two waves in collaboration
with Lucid. We have a sample of 2,081 respondents that is broadly representative of the
U.S. population in terms of age, race, gender, income, race, and region (column 5 of
Table C.1). We first measure basic demographics as well as a range of other background
characteristics and political views (Table E.1 of the Online Appendix provides a full
overview). We then introduce exogenous variation in perceptions of false claims made
by CNN in its political reporting. Specifically, we first tell our respondents that the U.S.
recently extracted a high-level CIA spy from Russia. We then tell our respondents that
some media outlets correctly reported that CIA extracted the spy because of widespread
media speculation about its sources, whereas other media outlets falsely reported that
CIA extracted the spy because it feared that President Trump would mishandle classified
information.26
We subsequently measure beliefs about the percent chance that CNN reported that
the spy was extracted because (i) the CIA feared that President Trump would mishandle
26The experiment involves no deception. For background information, see the following article in
Associated Press News: https://www.apnews.com/b432a20d85ca48a5bca6c3394920c7fe (accessed
October 2, 2019). In the article, CIA’s Director of Public Affairs, Brittany Bramell, is quoted as saying:
“CNN’s narrative that the Central Intelligence Agency makes life-or-death decisions based on anything other
than objective analysis and sound collection is simply false” and that “Misguided speculation that the presi-
dent’s handling of our nation’s most sensitive intelligence, which he has access to each and every day, drove
an alleged exfiltration operation is inaccurate.” The New York Times also wrote an article challenging CNN’s
reporting, writing that “former intelligence officials said there was no public evidence that Mr. Trump directly
endangered the source, and other current American officials insisted that media scrutiny of the agency’s
sources alone was the impetus for the extraction” (https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/09/us/politics/cia-
informant-russia.html, accessed October 2, 2019).
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classified information, or because (ii) of widespread media speculation about the CIA’s
sources. To introduce exogenous variation in perceptions of false claims in CNN news
reports, we provide a random subset of respondents with the following information
treatment:27
In its article, CNN reported that the spy was extracted because the CIA feared
that President Trump would mishandle classified information.
The treatment was purposefully framed in a neutral way to minimize experimenter demand
effects. We thereafter measure people’s demand for reading a different news article from
CNN on a related but different topic, namely the Trump impeachment inquiry.28 As in the
filtering experiment, respondents are told that they will receive access to the article at the
end of the survey if they say “Yes” to the article and that they will proceed with the survey
without receiving access to the article if they say “No.”
Finally, we ask a series of post-treatment beliefs about CNN and its reporting. Specifi-
cally, we measure trust, perceptions of quality and political bias in reporting, beliefs about
false claims made by CNN in its political reporting, and the percent chance that a CNN
article about President Trump would contain any false claims. We further measure beliefs
about strategic risk taking by separately asking respondents how likely they think it is
that CNN would publish articles based on “unverified and potentially misleading sources”
about (i) President Trump and (ii) Joe Biden (the then Democratic front-runner for the
2020 presidential race).
27To address concerns about differential curiosity between the treatment and control group, we inform
all respondents that we will tell them how the CNN covered the story “at some point later in the survey” just
before eliciting their prior beliefs.
28Wave 1 (n = 1,427) and wave 2 (n = 645) use identical instructions except for the introductory sentence
to the CNN article we use to measure the demand for news. We started data collection for wave 1 on
September 24, 2019, the day Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi announced the formal impeachment inquiry.
Subsequent rapid developments made us concerned that our article would be perceived as “old news,” which
is why we made an adjustment. Specifically, in wave 1, we tell respondents that “A recent whistleblower
complaint following a phone conversation between President Trump and a foreign leader led Democrats in
Congress to start an impeachment inquiry against the president.” We then inform them that CNN wrote an
article about the impeachment inquiry and measure their demand. In wave 2, we tell respondents that “CNN
today published a new story about the Trump impeachment inquiry” and measure their demand for this new
article. We include wave fixed effects in all specifications.
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Results As shown in Table 4, the treatment generates a highly significant first stage on
perceptions of false claims in CNN. Treated respondents are 2.8 percentage points more
likely to think that CNN articles about President Trump contains false claims (column 1,
p < 0.01), 6.6 percent of a standard deviation more likely to think that that CNN generally
makes false claims in its political reporting (column 2, p < 0.01), and 9.5 percent of
a standard deviation more likely to think that CNN publishes stories about President
Trump based on unverified and potentially misleading sources (column 3, p < 0.01).
We find suggestive evidence that treated respondents are also more likely to think that
CNN publishes unverified stories about Joe Biden (column 4), but the effect is smaller
than for President Trump and not statistically significant at conventional levels. Treated
respondents are also 3.3 percent of a standard deviation more likely to think that CNN
intentionally tries to hurt President Trump by publishing false claims (column 5), but this
effect is not statistically significant and also small compared to the treatment effect on
perceptions of whether CNN publishes stories based on unverified and misleading sources.
These results thus suggest that our respondents are more likely to interpret the false claim
as a mistake than as strategic distortion.
The treatment also affects more general perceptions of CNN: Treated respondents
think that news articles from CNN are 8.7 percent of a standard deviation lower in quality
(column 6, p < 0.01), 5.6 percentage points more likely to be politically biased (column 7,
p < 0.01), and 4.7 percent of a standard deviation less trustworthy (column 8, p < 0.10).
The effects on perceptions of quality and political bias are quantitatively similar to the
treatment effect observed in the main filtering experiment. The treatment effect on
perceptions of trust is, if anything, stronger than in the main filtering experiment.
Taken together, these results suggest that treated respondents perceive news articles
in CNN as less informative and more noisy—in particular when it comes to political
reporting about President Trump. Given these results, the more-information-is-better
principle predicts a strict decrease in the demand for news from CNN.29 Contrary to this
29As discussed in Section 4.1, informativeness is negatively affected irrespective of the reason for the
false claim.
29
theoretical prediction, the main result from this experiment is that treated respondents do
not reduce their demand for news from CNN. The point estimate on demand for news is an
increase of 0.8 percentage points with a standard error of 1.8 percentage points (column 9
of Table 4); i.e., close to zero and relatively precisely estimated. This finding suggests
that people’s demand for news is inelastic to perceptions of false claims. Furthermore, we
know from the filtering experiment that this result is not due to demand for news being
generally inelastic to beliefs about reporting.30
Are the patterns of heterogeneity we observe in the data consistent with respondents
having a preference for belief confirmation?31 To study the role of preference for belief
confirmation, we proxy people’s attitudes toward President Trump by their prior belief
that President Trump betrayed his oath of office and should thus be impeached. Treated
respondents who think that Trump is guilty should increase their demand for news because
they expect the article to contain more negative information about President Trump,
while treated respondents who believe that Trump is not guilty should decrease their
demand for news from CNN. Consistent with these predictions, treated respondents who
think that Trump is not guilty decrease their demand for news from CNN, while for
respondents who think that Trump is guilty, we observe a positive point estimate (column
9 of Table C.9). While the patterns we uncover are qualitatively consistent with people
having a preference for belief confirmation, the effects are far from being statistically
significant at conventional levels.
5 Discussion
Across two complementary experimental designs, we find that people’s demand for news
does not respond to exogenous variation in informativeness in ways predicted by the
30In the main filtering experiment, we find a treatment effect of −3.5 percentage points using a very
similar setup for the experimental design which results in comparable magnitudes of changes in perceptions
of article quality.
31Tables C.8 and C.9 show that there is little evidence of differential updating of beliefs about the news
source by political affiliation and beliefs about whether Trump is guilty. The relatively homogeneous
first-stage in beliefs justifies a reduced form approach for analyzing heterogeneous treatment effects.
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more-information-is-better principle. We show that this is not due to cognitive constraints,
suggesting an important role for psychological utility in news consumption.
Our findings imply that people’s preferences over news articles reflect more than
a pure taste for more information. While models of news consumption differ in their
assumptions, preferences over news articles probably result from trade-offs between three
key dimensions: (i) psychological utility from belief confirmation, (ii) the entertainment
value of news, and (iii) the value of information. We discuss how our results relate to each
dimension in turn.
Psychological utility arising from people’s intrinsic desire to confirm their prior
beliefs seems particularly relevant for models of political news consumption. Political
polarization and strong identification with one’s own political party create an incentive
to avoid cognitive dissonance by seeking like-minded news. Indeed, this mechanism has
been recognized in theoretical work on media markets. For example, Mullainathan and
Shleifer (2005) analyze the market for news assuming that consumers prefer news that
are closer to their partisan beliefs—a preference for cognitive consistency also present in
theories of mass communication (Severin and Tankard, 2000). Relatedly, Bernhardt et al.
(2008) assume that consumers receive consumption utility from political news containing
negative information about the other party’s candidates. We find some evidence consistent
with a preference for belief confirmation in driving political news consumption across the
different experiments. First, treated respondents in the main filtering experiment decrease
their demand for news. Moreover, the patterns of heterogeneity in treatment responses
from the filtering experiment are somewhat consistent with the predictions made by this
mechanism.32 Second, the result that treated respondents who think that a news outlet
is more likely to make false claims do not reduce their demand for this outlet is also
consistent with explanations based on psychological utility from belief confirmation.
A second motive that might shape people’s demand for political news is the pure
consumption or entertainment value of it. People may be motivated to read news for
32We do not observe a decrease in the demand for news in the placebo experiment where other potentially
conflicting psychological motives, such as a preference for belief confirmation, are arguably not affected by
the treatment.
31
the entertainment value from witty commentary or surprising revelations about public
figures (Ely et al., 2015). The entertainment value of political news could compensate
consumers for the cost of gathering information from news articles (Dyck et al., 2013).
Our findings from the filtering experiment suggest that the entertainment value of balanced
news might be perceived as lower. Moreover, the results from the false claims experiment
are consistent with people valuing more extreme news stories even if they are based on
unverifiable or even false information.
Finally, we consider the desire for more informative news as a driver of news con-
sumption. Even though we provide evidence that the desire for more informative news
is not the dominant motive for news acquisition in the context we study, it might still
be an important motive at play. Conceptually, information can have both instrumental
value if it informs decision-making and non-instrumental value arising from intrinsic
information preferences, i.e. people wanting to learn about the truth. One important caveat
for the interpretation of our results is that the value of information might vary across
decision-making contexts. We believe that future research should explore whether people
also violate the more-information-is-better principle in news domains in which people
have potentially stronger instrumental motives to acquire informative news. However,
whether people value more informative political news is of particular interest nonetheless
because it is a key input for the functioning of democracies (Strömberg, 2004).
6 Concluding remarks
Our paper provides the first causal evidence on whether the desire for more information
is people’s dominant motive for reading economic and political news in a context where
cognitive constraints are not binding. Our main finding is that respondents who learn
that a news outlet does not strategically suppress information, and thus expect to receive
more information, reduce their demand for articles from this outlet. Moreover, learning
that a news outlet makes false claims in its reporting does not decrease people’s demand
for news from this outlet. These findings are inconsistent with the theoretical benchmark
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prediction of the more-information-is-better principle and suggest that people hold other
motives for consuming news that sometimes dominate their desire for more information.
Understanding how both demand and supply side factors shape media content is of
high relevance due to the media’s influence on public discourse (King et al., 2017) and
political outcomes (DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007). Our findings suggest an important role
for demand-side explanations of media bias. The distinction between demand and supply
side factors has important policy implications as competition generally reinforces the
incentives to deliver the product consumers want. If people’s dominant motive for reading
news is to obtain more information, market regulations designed to increase competition
should reduce bias in reporting and improve information aggregation (Chan and Suen,
2009). However, our finding that people do not respond to variation in informativeness in
the way predicted by the more-information-is-better principle suggests that the effects of
regulation are more nuanced. The distinction between demand and supply side factors also
has important implications for demand-side policy interventions that aim to correct con-
sumers’ misperceptions of the informativeness of news, such as transparency initiatives to
inform consumers about the extent of media bias in markets and efforts of fact-checking or-
ganizations to debunk false claims. Under supply-driven media bias, increasing consumer
knowledge about media bias leads to welfare improvements by steering consumers toward
more informative news. Under demand-driven media bias, by contrast, such interventions
might backfire and actually increase political belief polarization by shifting people toward
more biased sources. Our findings thus demonstrate the complexity of optimal regulation
and policy.
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Figures and tables
Figure 1: Design features: Filtering (Experiment 1.1)
Enter the experiment (n = 4,631)
Pre-treatment questions
(i) Socioeconomic questions
(ii) Newspapers most likely to read
(iii) Beliefs about a NYT article
Randomization
Stratified assignment
based on political affiliation
Control group
n = 2,312
Treatment group
n = 2,319
Information treatment
NYT reported both statistics.
Cross-randomized
post-treatment outcomes
Demand for news (n = 3,864)
Willingness to read NYT article
Beliefs about reporting (n = 767)
Belief about filtering and omission
Post-treatment beliefs and characteristics
(i) Beliefs about the NYT and the CBO
(ii) Beliefs about article characteristics
(iii) Additional demographic questions
Exit the experiment
Notes: This figure shows the main features of our filtering experiment conducted with Dynata (Experiment
1.1). Our other filtering experiments have a similar structure but do not cross-randomize post-treatment
outcomes (Experiments 1.2, 1.3, 1.6, and 1.7; see Table 1).
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Table 1: Overview of experiments
Experiment Sample Treatments Arms Main Outcomes
Filtering
Experiment 1.1
Main filtering design
Wave 1: Jan 2019
Wave 2: Jan/Feb 2019
Wave 3: Feb 2019
Dynata:
representative sample
(region, income, gender,
education, and age);
n = 4,631
Treatment: Information about how the
NYT covered the CBO report on the
Health Bill
Control: No information
Demand for reading a NYT
article about the Tax bill;
Post-treatment beliefs
about reporting
Experiment 1.2
Robustness curiosity
September 2019
Lucid:
representative sample
(region, income, gender,
education, and age);
n = 3,387
Treatment: Information about how the
NYT covered the CBO report on the
Minimum Wage Bill
Control: No information
Demand for reading a NYT
article about a single-payer
health care system
Experiment 1.3
Cognitive constraints
placebo
April 2019
Dynata:
representative sample
(region, income, gender,
and age);
n = 930
Treatment: Information about how
many statistics from the CBO report on
the Health Bill the NYT reported
Control: No information
Demand for reading a NYT
article about the Tax Bill
Experiment 1.4
Information demand
May 2019
Lucid:
representative sample
(region, income, gender,
education, and age);
n = 703
None Demand for information
about CBO estimates for
the Tax Bill and the Health
Bill
Experiment 1.5
External validity
April 2019
MTurk:
n = 199
None Demand for reading a NYT
article about the Tax Bill;
Incentivized WTP for a
digital NYT subscription
Experiment 1.6
Incentives and reversed
article order
September 2018
MTurk:
Democrats and
Democrat-leaning
respondents;
n = 723
Treatment: Information about how the
NYT covered the CBO report on the Tax
Bill
Control: No information
Demand for reading a NYT
article about the Health Bill
Experiment 1.7
Platform robustness
January 2019
MTurk:
n = 1,332
Treatment: Information about how the
NYT covered the CBO report on the
Health Bill
Control: No information
Demand for reading a NYT
article about the Tax Bill
False claims
Experiment 2
False claims
Wave 1: Sep 2019
Wave 2: Oct 2019
Lucid:
representative sample
(region, income, gender,
education, and age);
n = 2,081
Treatment: Information about a false
statement in an CNN article
Control: No information
Demand for reading a CNN
news article about the
Trump Impeachment
Deceptive spin
Experiment 3
Deceptive spin
April 2019
MTurk:
n = 1,503
Treatment: Information about how the
NYT covered the CBO report on the cost
of the government shutdown (2019)
Control: No information
Demand for reading a NYT
article about the Tax Bill
Notes: This table provides an overview of all experiments. Wave 2 and 3 of Experiment 1.1 (n = 4,025) was registered in the
AEA RCT Registry as trial 3855.
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Table 2: Post-treatment beliefs: Filtering experiment
Beliefs: Less suppression Article characteristics The New York Times Congressional Budget Office
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Filtering Omission Quality Dryness Complex No bias Trust Curious No bias Trust Accuracy
Treatment 0.068*** 0.033 0.103* -0.004 0.048 0.041*** -0.018 -0.008 -0.013 0.017 0.063**
(0.020) (0.020) (0.060) (0.074) (0.074) (0.014) (0.027) (0.028) (0.015) (0.029) (0.029)
N 749 742 737 737 737 4563 4547 4547 4523 4523 4523
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Z-scored No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Control group mean 0.479 0.528 0 0 0 0.376 0 0 0.533 0 0
Note: This table displays main treatment effects on a series of post-treatment beliefs using data from Experiment 1.1 (see Table 1). Columns 1 to 5
use respondents who were cross-randomized into not receiving the option to read an article in the New York Times, while columns 6 to 11 use
all respondents. “Filtering” refers to the percent chance that the New York Times reported that the Trump Tax Plan would create 1.1 million
jobs. “Omission” refers to the percent chance that the New York Times wrote an article about the CBO’s analysis of granting citizenship to the
Dreamers. “Quality” refers to people’s perception of the quality of articles in the New York Times. “Dryness” captures people’s perception of
whether reporting of the New York Times is dry and technical. “Complex” measures people’s perception of whether reporting of the New York
Times is complex. “No bias” is a dummy variable taking value one if our respondents think that the New York Times is not politically biased
(column 6), and is defined similarly for the CBO (column 9). “Trust” measures people’s trust in the New York Times (column 7) and the CBO
(column 10). “Curious” measures people’s interest in learning whether the New York Times is biased. “Accuracy” measures people’s perception
of the accuracy of the forecasts of the CBO. The outcomes in columns 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, and 11 are measured on five-point Likert scales and then
z-scored. Regressions include the following controls: gender, age, income, region, race, education, employment status, frequency of reading the
New York Times, pre-treatment beliefs about the probability that the New York Times would report both statistics, beliefs about the consequences
of the policy bills, and experiment fixed effects.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3: Treatment effects on demand for news: Filtering experiments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Main
experiment
Curiosity
experiment
Robustness
experiments
Pooled across
all experiments
Treatment -0.035** -0.047*** -0.053*** -0.043***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.019) (0.009)
N 3858 3189 2169 9216
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control group mean 0.274 0.280 0.325 0.286
Note: This table shows OLS regressions where the dependent variable is an indicator
that takes the value one for respondents who wanted to read an article in the New
York Times about a CBO report. Column 1 includes respondents from our main ex-
periment (conducted with Dynata; Experiment 1.1; see Table 1). Column 2 includes
respondents from a robustness experiment to alleviate concerns about curiosity as a
mechanism (conducted with Lucid; Experiment 1.2; see Table 1). Column 3 includes
respondents from additional robustness experiments conducted on Amazon Mechani-
cal Turk (Experiments 1.6 and 1.7; see Table 1). Column 4 pools all respondents from
Columns 1 to 3. “Treatment” is an indicator that takes the value one for respondents
who received information that the New York Times did not suppress any key facts
from the CBO report. All regressions include the set of controls from Table 2.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 4: Treatment effects on beliefs and article demand: False claims experiment
Beliefs: Less informative reporting in CNN Perceptions of CNN CNN
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
False claims:
Trump
False claims:
News
Unverified:
Trump
Unverified:
Biden
Intention:
Hurt Trump
Quality No bias Trust Article
demand
Treatment 0.028*** 0.066*** 0.095*** 0.057 0.033 -0.087*** -0.056*** -0.047* 0.008
(0.009) (0.025) (0.029) (0.042) (0.027) (0.027) (0.019) (0.026) (0.018)
N 2069 2069 2069 2069 2069 2076 2069 2076 2081
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Z-scored No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
Control group mean 0.489 0 0 0 0 0 0.382 0 0.237
Note: This table shows main treatment effects on a series of post-treatment beliefs and demand for a CNN article from OLS regressions.
“Treatment” is an indicator that takes the value one for respondents who received information that the CNN falsely reported that the CIA
decided to extract a spy from Russia because it feared that President Trump would mishandle classified information. “False claims: Trump”
is the subjective percent chance that an article from CNN about President Trump would contain any false claims. “False claims: News”
measures how often people think CNN makes false claims in its political reporting. “Unverified: Trump” is the belief about how likely CNN
is to publish stories based on unverified and potentially misleading sources about Trump . “Unverified: Biden” is the analogous question
about Joe Biden. “Intention: Hurt Trump” is the belief about whether CNN intentionally makes false claims to hurt President Trump.
“Quality” refers to people’s perception of the quality of articles in CNN. “No bias” is a dummy variable taking value one if our respondents
think that the CNN is not politically biased. “Trust” measures people’s trust in CNN. “Article demand” is an indicator variable that takes
the value one for respondents who wanted to read an article from CNN about the impeachment process against President Trump. The
outcomes in all columns except for columns 1, 7 and 9 are measured on five-point Likert scales and then z-scored. Regressions include the
following controls: gender, age, income, region, race, education, employment status, political views, frequency of reading/watching CNN,
pre-treatment beliefs about the probability that the CNN would cite Trump as the reason for the extraction, views on whether Trump deserves
impeachment, pre-treatment beliefs about how often CNN makes false claims in its political reporting, beliefs about the acceptability of
publishing false claims stories, and wave fixed effects.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Summary of the Online Appendix
Section A contains proofs related to claims made in Section 2 and a discussion of prior
beliefs about reporting and patterns of treatment effect heterogeneity.
Section B contains additional figures. Figure B.1 shows pre-treatment beliefs about
information suppression in the New York Times, separately for Democrats and Republicans,
for Experiment 1.1. Figure B.2 shows pre-treatment beliefs about the consequences of
the Trump Tax Plan, separately for Democrats and Republicans, for Experiment 1.1.
Figure B.3 shows treatment effect on demand for news for respondents in Experiment
1.1. Figure B.4 shows heterogeneity in treatment effects by prior beliefs separately for
Democrats and Republicans for Experiment 1.1. Figure B.5 shows heterogeneity in
treatment effects by priors separately for Democrats and Republicans for Experiment 2.
Figure B.6 shows the demand for information from the CBO about the Trump Tax Plan
and the Trump Healthcare Plan from Experiment 1.4.
Section C contains additional tables. Table C.1 provides the summary statistics.
Table C.2 examines the integrity of randomization for the main filtering experiment 1.1.
Table C.3 provides evidence on heterogeneity by political affiliation in experiment 1.1.
Table C.4 shows heterogeneous effects by prior beliefs in experiment 1.1. Table C.5
provides further heterogeneity analysis to rule out potential confounds in Experiment 1.1.
Table C.6 shows the treatment effects separately for the filtering robustness experiment
(Experiments 1.6 and 1.7). Table C.7 shows the main treatment effects in the placebo
experiment (Experiment 1.3). Table C.8 shows heterogeneous treatment effects by political
affiliation on beliefs and article demand. Table C.9 provides evidence on heterogeneous
effects by people’s beliefs about whether Trump is guilty in the false claims experiment
1
(Experiment 2).
Section D describes the experimental design and the results for the experiment on
deceptive spin. Table D.1 provides an overview of the main results. Table D.2 shows
heterogeneous effects by prior beliefs in the deceptive spin experiment 3. Figure D.1 shows
heterogeneity in treatment effects by priors separately for Democrats and Republicans for
Experiment 3.
Section E contains screenshots of the instructions for all experiments. Table E.1
provides an overview of variables collected by experiment. Section E.1 shows the full set
of experimental instructions for Experiments 1.1 and 1.7. In Section E.2, we provide the
instructions for Experiment 1.2. In Section E.3, we show the instructions for Experiment
1.3. Section E.4 provides instructions for experiment 1.4. In Section E.5, we show the
instructions for Experiment 1.5. In Section E.6, we show the instructions for Experiment
1.6. Section E.7 shows the instructions for Experiment 2. In Section E.8, we show the
instructions for Experiment 3.
2
A Model appendix
A.1 Proofs
The following proposition provides the theoretical justification for the claims made in
Section 2 on how strategic information suppression affects the Blackwell informativeness
of news.
Proposition 1 (Filtering). Using the notation from Section 3, fix s = {s1, . . . ,sK} ∈ S
and two reporting strategies ρ,ρ ′ : S→ ∆(N). Let σ ,σ ′ : Θ→ ∆(N) be the information
structures induced by combining the source signal pi : Θ→ ∆(S) with the reporting
strategies, respectively. Suppose that (i) ρ(t | s) ≤ ρ ′(t | s) for all t ( s, (ii) ρ(s | s) >
ρ ′(s | s), and that (iii) ρ(· | s′) = ρ ′(· | s′) for all s′ 6= s. Then the information structure σ
is Blackwell more informative than σ ′.
Proof. It suffices to show that the conclusion obtains if we strengthen the assumption by
additionally assuming that ρ(t | s)< ρ ′(t | s) for some t ( s and that for all other t ′ ( s
with t ′ 6= t, we have ρ(t ′ | s) = ρ ′(t ′ | s). The general case then follows by applying the
result to the sequence ρ = ρ1, . . . ,ρL = ρ ′ where ρk and ρk+1 differ at most on the set
{s,s′} for some s′ ⊆ s and L = |P(s)|. Suppose that n ∈ N is a random variable with
state-dependent distribution σ . To show that σ is Blackwell more informative than σ ′,
it suffices to construct an n-measurable random variable n′ ∈ N with state-dependent
distribution σ ′, thereby establishing statistical sufficiency. We construct n′ as follows: let
n′ = n whenever n 6= s and set β = ρ ′(s | s)/ρ(s | s). If n = s, then n′ takes value s with
probability β and value t with probability 1−β . One can then verify that conditional on
the state θ ∈Θ, the distribution of n′ is σ ′(· | θ). This concludes the proof.
The following proposition provides the theoretical justification for the claims made in
Section 4.1 that increasing the likelihood of false claims reduces the Blackwell informa-
tiveness of a newspaper’s article.
Proposition 2 (False claims). Suppose there is a hidden state θ ∈ Θ = {L,R}. Let σθ
3
denote the probability of a news article reporting R if the state is θ and consider any triple
σL < σ ′L < σR. Then a newspaper article n with distribution (σL,σR) is Blackwell more
informative than an article n′ with distribution (σ ′L,σR).
Proof. Consider any triple σL < σ ′L < σR. We have to show that there is a stochastic
transformation τ such that the distribution of τ(n) is (σ ′L,σR). This amounts to finding
two probabilities α,β ∈ [0,1] such that we obtain the desired distributional equivalence if
we set α = P(n′ = R | n = R) and β = P(n′ = R | n = L). The probabilities α and β are
the solution to the following two equations:
σ ′L = ασL+β (1−σL) (2)
σR = ασR+β (1−σR) (3)
We can algebraically verify that a solution is given by
α = 1−
(
σ ′L−σL
σR−σL
)
(1−σR) and β =
(
σ ′L−σL
σR−σL
)
σR. (4)
Moreover, σL < σ ′L < σR implies that 0≤ β ≤ α ≤ 1. This concludes the proof.
A.2 Heterogeneity by beliefs about reporting
This section discusses the difficulties of making predictions about the patterns of het-
erogeneity with respect to prior beliefs about reporting in our experimental design. For
simplicity, suppose there is a binary state space Θ = {L,R} and focus on a consumer
who identifies as Democrat. This consumer holds a belief q > 12 that θ = L, and expects
a left-leaning outlet to provide a confirmatory signal with probability p ∈ [0,1]. In the
absence of a standard model of confirmatory preferences, we make the reduced form
assumption that the utility from news consumption U(p,q) depends of the consumer’s
prior belief about the state θ and the belief that the newspaper reports L. The consumer
prefers to read the article N if U(p,q)> v where v is the value of his outside option.
4
Models of confirmatory preferences would plausibly predict that ∂U∂ p ≥ 0 for consumers
with prior belief q > 0.5. Thus, an information treatment that weakly decreases p will
reduce the expected utility from news consumption, but affects the demand for news
only for marginal consumers with U sufficiently close to v. However, without additional
assumptions on (i) the marginal utility from p, (ii) the value of the outside option, and
(iii) the extent of Bayesian updating about p, the theoretical prediction for the interaction
effect between the information treatment and the prior belief p are ambiguous.
Figure A.1: Utility from news and beliefs about reporting
U(p,q)
p
v
p∗
p0
p1
To illustrate this point, Figure A.1 provides a stylized example of the utility from news
consumption. Suppose the consumer starts out with a prior p0 and strongly revises her
belief to p1 after receiving the treatment. While her utility U strongly declines, she also
started from a higher level, and thus still prefers reading the article. However, the treatment
could move respondents with a prior belief p1 below the cutoff p∗. This example thus
predicts a U-shaped pattern of treatment effect heterogeneity by people’s prior beliefs
about reporting: People with very low or very high beliefs that a newspaper reports L will
not adjust their demand (no treatment effect), whereas people with moderate priors will
reduce their demand (negative treatment effect).
5
B Additional figures
Figure B.1: Distribution of pre-treatment beliefs about information suppression in the
New York Times, by political views
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00
Probability of left-wing slant
 Panel A: Left-wing slant
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00
Probability of right-wing slant
 Panel B: Right-wing slant
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Notes: This figure uses data from Experiment 1.1 (see Table 1). It shows pre-treatment beliefs about
information suppression in the New York Times separately for Democrats (including Independents
leaning toward the Democratic Party) and Republicans (including Independents leaning toward the
Republican Party). Panel A shows data on beliefs about whether the New York Times slants to left (by
suppressing the statistic on the positive fiscal consequences of the Trump Healthcare Plan). Panel B
shows data on beliefs about whether the New York Times slants to right (by suppressing the statistic on
the negative social consequences of the Trump Healthcare Plan).
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Figure B.2: Distribution of pre-treatment beliefs about the impact of the Trump Tax Plan,
by political views
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Notes: This figure uses data from Experiment 1.1 (see Table 1). It shows pre-treatment beliefs about the
consequences of the Trump Tax Plan separately for Democrats (including Independents leaning toward
the Democratic Party) and Republicans (including Independents leaning toward the Republican Party).
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Figure B.3: Demand for news: Treatment versus control
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Notes: This figure uses data from Experiment 1.1 (see Table 1). It shows, separately for respondents in
the treatment and control group, the fraction of respondents who wanted to read an article in the New
York Times about the Trump Tax Plan. Error bars indicate the standard error of the mean.
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Figure B.4: Treatment effects by pre-treatment beliefs: Filtering
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Moderator: Prior of left-wing bias in the NYT
Panel A: Democrats by Prior Left
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Moderator: Prior of right-wing bias in the NYT
Panel B: Democrats by Prior Right
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Moderator: Prior of left-wing bias in the NYT
Panel C: Republicans by Prior Left
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Moderator: Prior of right-wing bias in the NYT
Panel D: Republicans by Prior Right
Notes: This figure displays heterogeneous treatment effects by respondents’ prior beliefs about how
the New York Times covered a CBO report about the consequences of the Trump Healthcare Plan
(Hainmueller et al., 2019). “Prior left” is the percent chance (from 0 to 1) that the New York Times wrote
an article about the CBO estimates on the Trump Healthcare Plan that mentioned only the number of
people who would lose health coverage. “Prior right” is the percent chance (from 0 to 1) that the New
York Times wrote an article about the CBO estimates on the Trump Healthcare Plan that mentioned
only the impact on the federal debt. This figures uses respondents from experiment 1.1 (see Table 1).
Democrats included in this figure are respondents who either identify with the Democratic Party or
identify as Independents leaning toward the Democratic Party, and excludes respondents who think that
the Trump Tax Plan will have somewhat positive or very positive consequences. Republicans included
in this figure are respondents who either identify with the Republican Party or identify as Independents
leaning toward the Republican Party, and excludes respondents who think that the Trump Tax Plan will
have somewhat negative or very negative consequences. The dashed red curve shows smoothed kernel
density estimates for the moderating prior variable.
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Figure B.5: Treatment effects by pre-treatment beliefs: False claims
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Moderator: Prior of CNN making false claims
 Panel B: Republicans
Notes: This figure displays heterogeneous treatment effects by respondents’ belief about false claims in
CNN articles (Hainmueller et al., 2019). The figures uses respondents from Experiment 2 (the false
claims experiment; see Table 1). “Prior of CNN making false claims” is respondents’ pre-treatment
beliefs (from 0 to 1) that CNN falsely reported that the CIA made the decision to extract the spy because
it feared that President Trump would mishandle classified information and their political affiliation.
Democrats included in this figure are respondents who either identify with the Democratic Party or
identify as Independents leaning toward the Democratic Party. Republicans included in this figure are
respondents who either identify with the Republican Party or identify as Independents leaning toward
the Republican Party. The dashed red curve shows smoothed kernel density estimates for the moderating
prior variable.
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Figure B.6: Demand for information about CBO statistics
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Notes: This figure uses data from an experiment with Lucid (Experiment 1.4, see Table 1). The figure
shows, separately for Democrats/Democrat-leaners and Republicans/Republican-leaners, the fraction
of respondents who wanted information about different statistics from the CBO reports. Specifically,
respondents were either asked about their demand for information about the Trump Tax Plan (see Panel
A) or about their demand for information about the Trump Healthcare Plan (see Panel B). Respondents
were then asked separately and in randomized order for each of the two headline statistics from the
respective CBO report, whether they want to receive the CBO’s point estimate or not. However,
respondents do not know anything about the value of the statistics prior to making the decision. If they
selected “Yes”, we provided them with the information at the end of the survey. “Debt” is the share of
respondents who want to learn how the Trump Tax Plan will affect the federal debt. “Jobs” is the share
of respondents who want to learn how the Trump Tax Plan will affect the number of jobs. “Deficit” is
the share of respondents who want to learn how the Trump Healthcare Plan will affect the federal deficit.
“Uninsured” is the share of respondents who want to learn how the Trump Healthcare Plan will affect the
number of people with health coverage.
11
C Additional tables
Table C.1: Summary statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Main exp. Curiosity Robustness Spin False claims Cognitive
Male 0.442 0.459 0.508 0.446 0.421 0.463
Age (midpoint) 48.546 42.712 36.063 39.249 46.170 44.774
White 0.871 0.779 0.797 0.783 0.772 0.846
Log income 3.355 3.099 3.349 3.333 3.353 3.499
College education 0.450 0.301 0.675 0.662 0.554 0.556
Full-time work 0.392 0.477 0.782 0.685 0.483 0.490
Northeast 0.195 0.161 0.217 0.178 0.216 0.218
Midwest 0.245 0.232 0.225 0.209 0.255 0.218
West 0.192 0.169 0.147 0.254 0.179 0.208
South 0.369 0.438 0.411 0.359 0.350 0.356
Republican 0.325 0.300 0.163 0.250 0.308 0.320
Democrat 0.340 0.355 0.553 0.437 0.399 0.343
Observations 4625 3189 2169 1503 2081 930
Note: This table displays the mean value of basic covariates for each experiment (see Table 1
for an overview). Specifically, “Main exp.” refers to experiment 1.1, “Curiosity” refers to
experiment 1.2, “Robustness” refers to experiment 1.6 and 1.7, “Spin” refers to experiment 3,
“False Claims” refers to experiment 2, and “Cognitive” refers to experiment 1.3. “Male” is a
binary variable with value one for male respondents. “Age” is coded as the continuous mid-
point of the age bracket (18 to 24, 25 to 34, 35 to 44, 45 to 54, 55 to 64, 65 or older). “White”
is a binary variable with value one if the respondent selected “Caucasian/White”. “Log in-
come” is coded continuously as the logarithm of the income bracket’s midpoint (Less than
$15,000, $15,000 to $24,999, $25,000 to $49,999, $50,000 to $74,999, $75,000 to $99,999,
$100,000 to $149,999, $150,000 to $200,000, $200,000 or more). “College education” is a
binary dummy variable taking value one if the respondent selected “Some college, no degree”,
“Associates degree”, “Bachelor’s degree”, or “Post-graduate degree”. “Full-time work” is a
binary dummy variable taking value one if the respondent is working full-time. “Northeast”,
“Midwest”, “West” and “South” are binary dummy variables with value one if the respondent
lives in the respective region. “Republican” and “Democrat” are binary dummy variables with
value one if the respondent identifies as Republican or Democrat.
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Table C.2: Test of balance
Treatment (T) Control (C) P-value(T - C) Observations
Gender 0.45 0.44 0.703 4631
Age 48.30 48.78 0.314 4631
Log income 10.91 10.88 0.248 4025
South 0.36 0.37 0.473 4631
West 0.20 0.18 0.196 4631
Northeast 0.19 0.20 0.216 4631
Republicans 0.33 0.32 0.907 4631
Democrats 0.34 0.34 0.916 4631
White 0.87 0.87 0.963 4458
College education 0.45 0.45 0.563 4488
Notes: This table provides a balance test for the main filtering experiment (Experiment
1.1; see Table 1). The p-value of a joint F-test regressing the treatment indicator on a
series of observables is given by p = 0.62. “Gender” is a binary variable with value one
for male respondents. “Age” is coded as the continuous midpoint of the age bracket
(18 to 24, 25 to 34, 35 to 44, 45 to 54, 55 to 64, 65 or older). “Log income” is coded
continuously as the logarithm of the income bracket’s midpoint (Less than $15,000,
$15,000 to $24,999, $25,000 to $49,999, $50,000 to $74,999, $75,000 to $99,999,
$100,000 to $149,999, $150,000 to $200,000, $200,000 or more). “South”, “West”,
and “Northeast” are binary dummy variables with value one if the respondent lives
in the respective region. “Republican” and “Democrat” are binary dummy variables
with value one if the respondent identifies as Republican or Democrat. “White” is a
binary variable with value one if the respondent selected “Caucasian/White”. “College
education” is a binary dummy variable taking value one if the respondent selected
“Some college, no degree”, “Associates degree”, “Bachelor’s degree”, or “Post-graduate
degree”.
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Table C.3: Political heterogeneity in treatment responses: Filtering experiment
Beliefs: Less suppression Article characteristics The New York Times Congressional Budget Office NYT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Filtering Omission Quality Dryness Complex No bias Trust Curious No bias Trust Accuracy Demand
Treatment 0.027 0.048* 0.122* 0.033 0.074 0.055*** -0.011 -0.012 0.007 0.042 0.109*** -0.035*
(0.028) (0.026) (0.072) (0.091) (0.096) (0.020) (0.036) (0.037) (0.020) (0.043) (0.042) (0.020)
Treatment × Rep. 0.083** -0.033 -0.067 -0.080 -0.050 -0.028 -0.017 0.008 -0.041 -0.049 -0.095 -0.001
(0.040) (0.040) (0.115) (0.147) (0.147) (0.027) (0.054) (0.055) (0.029) (0.057) (0.058) (0.027)
N 749 742 737 737 737 4563 4547 4547 4523 4523 4523 3858
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Z-scored No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Control group mean 0.479 0.528 0 0 0 0.376 0 0 0.533 0 0 0.274
Note: This table displays heterogeneous treatment effects by political affiliation on a series of post-treatment beliefs in addition to article demand using
data from Experiment 1.1 (see Table 1). “Rep.” is an indicator that takes the value one for self-identified Republicans and Independents who lean toward
the Republican Party. Columns 1 to 5 use respondents who were cross-randomized into not receiving the option to read an article in the New York Times,
while column 6 to 11 use all respondents. “Filtering” refers to the percent chance that the New York Times reported that the Trump Tax Plan would create
1.1 million jobs. “Omission” refers to the percent chance that the New York Times wrote an article about the CBO’s analysis of granting citizenship to
the dreamers. “Quality” refers to people’s perception of the quality of articles in the New York Times. “Dryness” captures people’s perception of whether
reporting of the New York Times is dry and technical. “Complex” measures people’s perception of whether reporting of the New York Times is complex.
“No bias” (column 6) is a dummy variable taking value one if our respondents think that the New York Times is not politically biased. “Trust” (column 7)
measures people’s trust in the New York Times. “Curious” measures people’s interest in learning whether the New York Times is biased. “Accuracy” measures
people’s perception of the accuracy of the forecasts of the CBO. “No bias” (column 9) measures people’s perception of whether the CBO is biased. “Trust”
(column 10) measures people’s trust in the CBO. “Demand” is a dummy variable taking value one if our respondents wanted to read an article in the New
York Times about the Trump Tax Plan. The outcomes in columns 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, and 11 are measured on five-point Likert scales and then z-scored. All
regressions include the set of controls from Table 2.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table C.4: Heterogeneity by beliefs about reporting: Filtering experiments
Democrats Republicans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treatment -0.032 -0.016 -0.015 0.012 -0.040** -0.043 -0.006 0.036
(0.021) (0.030) (0.026) (0.037) (0.020) (0.028) (0.026) (0.045)
Treatment × Prior Left -0.049 -0.068 0.007 -0.073
(0.061) (0.063) (0.053) (0.064)
Treatment × Prior Right -0.098 -0.118 -0.120** -0.165**
(0.080) (0.083) (0.054) (0.065)
N 1796 1796 1796 1796 1589 1589 1589 1589
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control group mean 0.317 0.317 0.317 0.317 0.227 0.227 0.227 0.227
Note: This table shows OLS regressions where the dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value one
for respondents who wanted to read an article in the New York Times about a CBO report. The sample includes
respondents from our main filtering experiment (Experiment 1; see Table 1). Columns 1 to 4 use respondents
who either identify with the Democratic Party or identify as Independents leaning toward the Democratic Party,
and excludes respondents who think that the Trump Tax Plan will have somewhat positive or very positive
consequences. Columns 5 to 8 use respondents who either identify with the Republican Party or identify as
Independents leaning toward the Republican Party, and excludes respondents who think that the Trump Tax Plan
will have somewhat negative or very negative consequences. “Prior Left” is the percent chance (from 0 to 1) that
the New York Times wrote an article about the CBO estimates on the Trump Healthcare Plan that mentioned only
the number of people who would lose health coverage. “Prior Right” is the percent chance (from 0 to 1) that the
New York Times wrote an article about the CBO estimates on the Trump Healthcare Plan that mentioned only the
impact on the federal debt. All regressions include the set of controls from Table 2.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table C.5: Treatment effects on demand for news in the filtering experiment: Interaction
effects
(1) (2)
Treatment -0.027 -0.041**
(0.018) (0.017)
Interactant 0.015 0.042*
(0.020) (0.022)
Treatment × Interactant -0.018 0.015
(0.028) (0.028)
Interactant Portfolio College
N 3858 3858
Controls Yes Yes
Note: This table uses data from our main filtering experiment (Experiment 1.1; see
Table 1). This table displays heterogeneous treatment effects on people’s demand for
reading an article in the New York Times. “Portfolio” takes value one for respondents
who read both at least one left-wing newspaper and one right-wing newspaper. “Col-
lege” takes value 1 for respondents who received at least some college education. All
regressions include the set of controls from Table 2.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table C.6: Treatment effects on demand for news: Robustness experiments
(1) (2)
Experiment 1.6
Incentives and reverse order
Experiment 1.7
Platform robustness
Treatment -0.040 -0.063***
(0.036) (0.023)
N 752 1417
Controls Yes Yes
Control group mean 0.392 0.289
Note: This table shows OLS regressions where the dependent variable is an indicator
that takes the value one for respondents who wanted to read an article in the New York
Times (see Table 1). Regressions include the following controls: gender, age, income,
region, race, education, employment status, frequency of reading the New York Times,
pre-treatment beliefs about the probability that the New York Times would report both
statistics, and beliefs about the consequences of the policy bills.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table C.7: Treatment effects: Placebo experiment
(1) (2) (3)
Article demand Quality No bias
Treatment 0.015 0.099* 0.019
(0.029) (0.054) (0.030)
N 930 928 928
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Z-scored No Yes No
Control group mean 0.265 0 0.384
Note: This table shows OLS regressions using data from the “Placebo experiment” con-
ducted with Dynata (Experiment 1.3; see Table 1). “Treatment” is an indicator taking
the value one for respondents who were informed that the New York Times reported
two out of two statistics from the CBO report. “Article demand” is a binary variable
with value one if the respondent wanted to read the New York Times article about the
Trump Tax Plan. “Quality” refers to perceptions of quality in the New York Times and
is measured on a 5-point Likert scale and then z-scored by the mean and standard
deviation of control group respondents. “No bias” is a binary variable with value one
if the respondent thinks that the New York Times is not politically biased. Regressions
include the following controls: gender, age, income, region, race, education, employ-
ment status, and prior beliefs that the New York Times would report both statistics.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table C.8: Political heterogeneity in treatment effects on beliefs and article demand: False claims experiment
Beliefs: Less informative reporting in CNN Perceptions of CNN CNN
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
False claims:
Trump
False claims:
News
Unverified:
Trump
Unverified:
Biden
Intention:
Hurt Trump
Quality No bias Trust Article
demand
Treatment 0.032*** 0.062* 0.120*** 0.128** 0.046 -0.105*** -0.078*** -0.086** -0.003
(0.012) (0.033) (0.044) (0.050) (0.040) (0.035) (0.028) (0.035) (0.025)
Treatment × Republican/lean Rep -0.013 0.006 -0.063 -0.159* -0.035 0.043 0.050 0.092* 0.023
(0.018) (0.050) (0.058) (0.087) (0.054) (0.054) (0.036) (0.053) (0.036)
N 2069 2069 2069 2069 2069 2076 2069 2076 2081
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Z-scored No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
Control group mean 0.489 0 0 0 0 0 0.382 0 0.237
Note: This table shows main treatment effects on a series of post-treatment beliefs in addition to article demand (OLS regressions), using data from experi-
ment 2 (see Table 1). “Treatment” is an indicator that takes the value one for respondents who received information that the CNN falsely reported that
the CIA decided to extract a spy from Russia because it feared that President Trump would mishandle classified information. “Republican/Lean Rep” is
an indicator that takes the value one for respondents who identify with the Republican Party or identify as Independents leaning toward the Republican
Party. “False claims: Trump” is the subjective percent chance that an article in CNN about President Trump would contain any false claims. “False claims:
News” measures how often people think CNN makes false claims in its political reporting. “Unverified: Trump” is beliefs about how likely CNN is to
publish stories based on unverified and potentially misleading sources about President Trump. “Unverified: Biden” is the analogous question about Joe
Biden. “Intention: Hurt Trump” is beliefs about whether CNN intentionally makes false claims to hurt Trump. “Quality” refers to people’s perception of the
quality of articles in CNN. “No bias” is a dummy variable taking value one if our respondents think that CNN is not politically biased. “Trust” measures
people’s trust in CNN. “Article demand” is an indicator variable that takes the value one for respondents who wanted to read an article in the CNN about the
impeachment process against President Trump. The outcomes in all columns except for columns 1, 7 and 9 are measured on five-point Likert scales and
then z-scored. Regressions include the same set of controls as Table 4.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table C.9: Heterogeneity in treatment effects on beliefs and article demand by views on impeachment: False claims experiment
Beliefs: Less informative reporting in CNN Perceptions of CNN CNN
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
False claims:
Trump
False claims:
News
Unverified:
Trump
Unverified:
Biden
Intention:
Hurt Trump
Quality No bias Trust Article
demand
Treatment 0.030** 0.102*** 0.097*** -0.021 0.060* -0.098** -0.043* -0.038 -0.013
(0.012) (0.037) (0.038) (0.071) (0.036) (0.042) (0.024) (0.040) (0.026)
Treatment × Support Impeachment -0.003 -0.062 -0.004 0.138 -0.047 0.019 -0.023 -0.016 0.038
(0.017) (0.050) (0.057) (0.087) (0.053) (0.054) (0.036) (0.053) (0.036)
N 2069 2069 2069 2069 2069 2076 2069 2076 2081
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Z-scored No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
Control group mean 0.489 0 0 0 0 0 0.382 0 0.237
Note: This table shows main treatment effects on a series of post-treatment beliefs in addition to article demand (OLS regressions), using data from
experiment 2 (see Table 1). “Treatment” is an indicator that takes the value one for respondents who received information that the CNN falsely reported
that the CIA decided to extract a spy from Russia because it feared that President Trump would mishandle classified information. “Support Impeachment”
is an indicator that takes the value one for respondents who said “Yes” to the question of whether President Trump should be impeached (this question
was elicited pre-treatment). “False claims: Trump” is the subjective percent chance that an article in CNN about President Trump would contain any
false claims. “False claims: News” measures how often people think CNN makes false claims in its political reporting. “Unverified: Trump” is beliefs
about how likely CNN is to publish stories based on unverified and potentially misleading sources about President Trump. “Unverified: Biden” is the
analogous question about Joe Biden. “Intention: Hurt Trump” is beliefs about whether CNN intentionally makes false claims to hurt Trump. “Quality”
refers to people’s perception of the quality of articles in CNN. “No bias” is a dummy variable taking value one if our respondents think that CNN is not
politically biased. “Trust” measures people’s trust in CNN. “Article demand” is an indicator variable that takes the value one for respondents who wanted
to read an article in the CNN about the impeachment process against President Trump. The outcomes in all columns except for columns 1, 7 and 9 are
measured on five-point Likert scales and then z-scored. Regressions include the same set of controls as Table 4.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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D Experiment on deceptive spin
The filtering and false claims experiments leveraged variation in the quantity of information
and the truthfulness of statements. We now consider a more subtle but prevalent form of
media bias, which weakly decreases the informativeness of news, “deceptive spin.”1 By
deceptive spin we mean newspapers’ tendency to emphasize facts that favor a particular
interpretation of an event which may be misleading. Specifically, we exogenously vary
people’s perceptions of the extent to which the New York Times spins news reports in
politically biased way by using potentially misleading statistics. We argue that the “more
information-is-better” principle would predict that people should reduce their demand for
news when realizing that a newspaper provided a misleading statistic.
Experimental design and sample We recruited approximately 1,500 respondents from
Amazon Mechanical Turk in April 2019 (Experiment 3 in Table 1). We first elicit people’s
beliefs about the economic consequences of the five-week government shutdown that
started after disagreement about funding for the proposed U.S.–Mexico wall and ended
in January 2019. We then inform our respondents that the CBO analyzed the economic
consequences of the shutdown and concluded that it had cost the U.S. economy $11 billion,
of which $3 billion would be permanently lost. Since President Donald Trump was largely
seen as responsible for the shutdown,2 newspapers could spin the story in a left-wing way
by emphasizing the “high” short-term cost estimate ($11 billion) or in a right-wing way
by emphasizing the “low” long-term cost estimate ($3 billion).3
1While the theoretical link to informativeness is not as strong as in the previous two cases, the prevalence
of deceptive spin provides a strong empirical justification for studying how the demand for news responds
to perceptions of spin.
2See, for instance, the following article: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2019-01-14/trump-took-responsibility-for-shutdown-and-voters-give-it-to-him
(accessed April 08, 2019).
3Newspapers writing about the findings emphasized different statistics in their headlines. For instance,
the Wall Street Journal, which leans center-right, reported only the $3 billion statistic in its headline (“CBO:
Shutdown Will Cost Government $3 Billion of Projected 2019 GDP,” https://www.wsj.com/articles/
cbo-shutdown-will-cost-government-3-billion-of-projected-2019-gdp-11548688574),
whereas the New York Times, which leans center-left, only reported the $11 billion statistic (“Government
Shutdown Cost U.S. Economy $11 Billion, C.B.O. Says,” https://nyti.ms/2S75xrK). Both articles
were accessed on April 08, 2019.
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We thereafter inform our respondents that the New York Times wrote an article about
the CBO findings using one of the following two headlines: (i) “Government Shutdown
Cost U.S. Economy $11 Billion, C.B.O. Says”; (ii) “Government Shutdown Cost U.S.
Economy $3 Billion, C.B.O. Says”. We then ask respondents to state the percent chance
they assign to the New York Times using each headline for its story about the CBO
estimates (which needed to add up to 100 percent). To introduce exogenous variation
in people’s belief about left-wing spin in the New York Times, we then inform a random
subset of respondents that the New York Times used the headline featuring the $11 billion
statistic. We use the same behavioral outcome measure as in the filtering experiment,
namely people’s demand for a New York Times article about the consequences of the
Trump Tax Plan. We also ask a series of post-treatment questions such as perceptions of
quality and bias, or trust in the New York Times.
Results Table D.1 shows that the information provision about the headline changed
people’s perceptions of bias and quality of news reporting. Treated respondents perceive
the quality of reporting as lower (column 1) and think that the New York Times is more
politically biased (column 3). If anything, both Democrats and Republicans perceive the
New York Times as less trustworthy (columns 6 and 10). This suggests that both Democrats
and Republicans alike perceive the long-term permanent cost of the shutdown as the more
relevant and more informative measure of economic costs.
On average, we observe an insignificant 2 percentage point decrease in demand for
news (column 4), which is driven by Republican respondents (column 12). For Democrats,
however, we see no average decrease in demand for news (column 8), even though they
think that the quality of reporting in the New York Times is lower. The lack of a decrease
among Democrats is inconsistent with the predictions of “more-information-is-better
principle.”
Heterogeneity by belief confirmation Our treatment should (weakly) increase respon-
dents’ belief that the New York Times slants to the left. This in turn means that treated
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Democratic respondents with a more biased pre-treatment belief about the slant of the New
York Times will learn that the newspaper is more likely to confirm their existing beliefs;
on the other hand, treated Republican respondents with more biased pre-treatment beliefs
about the slant of the New York Times will learn that the New York Times is less likely to
confirm their existing beliefs. We non-parametrically examine treatment effects by prior
beliefs separately for Republicans and Democrats in Figure D.1. We find patterns consis-
tent with respondents having a preference for belief confirmation. The treatment polarizes
news consumption between Democrats and Republicans. Democrats who initially placed
a higher percent chance that the New York Times slants to the right do not decrease their
demand for news, while Republicans who initially placed a higher percent chance that the
New York Times slants to the right strongly decrease their demand once they learn that the
New York Times is more likely to use a left-wing biased headline.
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Table D.1: Treatment effects on demand for news: Spin experiment
Full sample Democrats/lean Democrat Republicans/lean Republican
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Quality Trust No bias Demand Quality Trust No bias Demand Quality Trust No bias Demand
Treatment -0.098** -0.065 -0.040* -0.020 -0.103** -0.070 -0.058* -0.003 -0.093 -0.080 -0.009 -0.048
(0.044) (0.042) (0.023) (0.023) (0.050) (0.049) (0.032) (0.030) (0.078) (0.073) (0.030) (0.034)
N 1498 1500 1500 1503 929 930 930 931 569 570 570 572
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Z-scored Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Control group mean 0 0 0.340 0.290 0.330 0.350 0.450 0.320 -0.580 -0.620 0.170 0.250
Note: This table displays main treatment effects on article demand and a series of post-treatment beliefs for the spin experiment (Experiment
3; see Table 1). Columns 1 to 4 use the full sample. Columns 5 to 8 use respondents who identify with the Democratic Party and respondents
who identify as Independents but lean toward the Democratic Party. Column 9 to 12 use respondents who identify with the Republican Party
and respondents who identify as Independents but lean toward the Republican Party. “Treatment” is an indicator that takes the value one for
respondents who received information that the New York Times used a headline featuring the $11 billion short-term cost (rather than the $3 billion
long-term cost) of the government shutdown. “Quality” refers to people’s perception of the quality of articles in the New York Times. “Trust”
measures people’s trust in the New York Times. The quality and trust outcomes are measured on five-point Likert scales and then z-scored using
the mean and standard deviation for control group respondents. “No bias” is a dummy variable taking value one if our respondents think that
the New York Times is not politically biased. “Demand” is an indicator variable that takes the value one for respondents who wanted to read an
article in the New York Times about the G.O.P. Tax Bill. Regressions include the following controls: gender, age, income, region, race, education,
employment status, frequency of reading the New York Times, pre-treatment beliefs about the probability that the New York Times would use a
headline featuring the $3 billion number, and pre-treatment beliefs about the consequences of the shutdown.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table D.2: Political heterogeneity in demand for news: Spin experiment
Democrats/lean Dem Republicans/lean Rep
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment -0.003 -0.098** -0.048 0.003
(0.030) (0.049) (0.034) (0.047)
Treatment × Prior: 3 billion 0.303** -0.198
(0.126) (0.141)
N 931 931 572 572
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control group mean 0.318 0.318 0.245 0.245
Note: This table displays OLS regressions using respondents from Experiment 3 (see
Table 1). The dependent variable in all columns is an indicator that takes the value
one for respondents who wanted to read an article in the New York Times about the
Trump Tax Plan. “Treatment” is an indicator that takes the value one for respondents
who received information that the New York Times used a headline featuring the $11
billion short-term cost (rather than the $3 billion long-term cost) of the government
shutdown. “Prior: 3 billion” is the percent chance (from 0 to 1) that the New York
Times wrote an article about the CBO’s evaluation of the government shutdown with
a headline mentioning the long-run cost of $3 billion rather than the short-run costs
of $11 billion. Column 1 and 2 use respondents who identify with the Democratic
Party and respondents who identify as Independents but lean toward the Democratic
Party. Column 3 and 4 use respondents who identify with the Republican Party and
respondents who identify as Independents but lean toward the Republican Party. Re-
gressions include the following controls: gender, age, income, region, race, education,
employment status, frequency of reading the New York Times, pre-treatment beliefs
about the probability that the New York Times would use a headline featuring the $3
billion number, and pre-treatment beliefs about the consequences of the shutdown.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Figure D.1: Treatment effects by pre-treatment beliefs: Spin
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Moderator: Prior of right-wing bias in the NYT
 Panel A: Democrats
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Moderator: Prior of right-wing bias in the NYT
 Panel B: Republicans
Notes: This figure displays heterogeneous treatment effects (Hainmueller et al., 2019) for the deceptive
spin experiment (Experiment 3; see Table 1) by respondents’ prior beliefs about how the New York
Times covered a CBO report about the consequences of the government shutdown in early January,
2019. “Prior of right-wing bias in the NYT” is the percent chance (from 0 to 1) that the New York Times
wrote an article about the CBO’s evaluation of the government shutdown with a headline mentioning
the long-run cost of $3 billion rather than the short-run costs of $11 billion. “Democrats/Lean Dem”
are respondents who identify with the Democratic Party and respondents who identify as Independents
but lean toward the Democratic Party. “Republican/Lean Rep” are respondents who identify with the
Republican Party and respondents who identify as Independents but lean toward the Republican Party.
The dashed red curve shows smoothed kernel density estimates for the moderating prior variable.
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E Instructions
This section contains screenshots from all experiments. Table E.1 provides an overview of
measures collected for each experiment. We provide screenshots of the full experimental
instructions for the main filtering design (Experiment 1.1; see Table 1). For all other
experiments, we always provide screenshots of the instructions used to measure pre-
treatment beliefs about reporting, the information treatment, and the measure of article
demand used in the experiment. We also provide screenshots of elements that differ from
the main design. For example, the robustness curiosity experiment (Experiment 1.2; see
Table 1) informs all respondents pre-treatment that they will learn about how the New York
Times reported about a CBO report at the end of the survey. To avoid repetition, we do
not include screenshots of demographic variables and post-treatment measures for other
experiments if they are measured similarly to the main filtering design.
1
Table E.1: Overview of measures collected by experiment
Experiment: 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 2 3
Attention check Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Gender Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Yes Yes No
Household size Yes Yes
Household income Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnicity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Race Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employment status Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Subscription to the NYT Yes Yes
Frequency of reading the NYT Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Frequency of reading CNN Yes
3 newspapers most likely to read Yes Yes Yes Yes
Acceptable to use unverified sources Yes
Political affiliation (3-point scale) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political affiliation (5-point scale) Yes Yes
Political leaning (for Independents) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Voting: 2016 Yes Yes Yes
Voting: 2012 Yes Yes
Approval: Trump’s policy agenda Yes Yes Yes Yes
Impeach Trump Yes
Pre-treatment beliefs: Tax Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pre-treatment beliefs: Health Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pre-treatment beliefs: Dreamers Yes
Pre-treatment beliefs: Shutdown Yes
Pre-treatment beliefs: False claims Yes
Beliefs about reporting H MW H H T H CIA GS
Article demand T SP T T H T I T
Posterior: Filtering (cont.) Yes Yes
Posterior: Omission (cont.) Yes Yes
Posterior: Quality (5-point) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Posterior: Dry and technical (5-point) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Posterior: Complex (5-point) Yes Yes Yes
Political bias (5-point) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trust (5-point) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Curiosity about NYT’s bias (4-point) Yes Yes
CBO: Trust (5-point) Yes Yes
CBO: Accuracy (5-point) Yes Yes
CBO: Political bias (5-point) Yes Yes Yes
Top three reasons for reading news Yes
Section: Most interesting Yes
Platform to read news Yes
Willingness to pay Yes
Info demand: Debt (Tax) Yes
Info demand: Jobs (Tax) Yes
Info demand: Deficit (Health) Yes
Info demand: Insured (Health) Yes
Posterior: False claims (5-point) Yes
Posterior: False claims (cont.) Yes
Intention: Hurt Trump (5-point) Yes
Intention: Hurt Biden (5-point) Yes
Notes: This table provides an overview of collected variables by experiment (see Table 1). Rows above “Beliefs about
reporting” contain measures collected pre-treatment. “Beliefs about reporting” refers to the pre-treatment belief elicitation
about how a news outlet reported underlying facts. “Article demand” is the main outcome of interest. Rows below “Article
demand” contain measures collected post-treatment. “H” refers to the New York Times article about the CBO evaluation of
the Trump Healthcare Plan. “T” refers to the New York Times article about the CBO evaluation of the Trump Tax Plan. “GS”
refers to the New York Times article about the CBO evaluation of the government shutdown in 2019. “MW” refers to the New
York Times article about the CBO evaluation of raising the minimum wage to $15. “SP” refers to the New York Times article
about the CBO evaluation a single-payer health care system. “I” refers to the CNN article about the impeachment inquiry.
“CIA” refers to the CNN article about the extraction of a CIA spy from inside Russia.
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E.1 Experiment 1.1 and 1.7
E.1.1 Attention Check (Experiment 1.1)
E.1.2 Pre-treatment beliefs and characteristics (Experiment 1.1 and 1.7)
3
4
5
6
E.1.3 Prior: Filtering (Experiment 1.1 and 1.7)
E.1.4 Treatment (Experiment 1.1 and 1.7)
7
E.1.5 Main outcome (Experiment 1.1 and 1.7)
E.1.6 Posterior beliefs (Wave 2 of Experiment 1.1 only)
8
9
E.1.7 Perceptions: NYT and CBO (Experiment 1.1)
10
11
12
E.1.8 Post-treatment beliefs and characteristics (Experiment 1.1)
13
14
E.1.9 End of Survey
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E.2 Experiment 1.2 – Robustness curiosity
E.2.1 Pre-treatment beliefs and characteristics
16
17
18
19
20
E.2.2 Belief elicitation
21
22
E.2.3 Treatment
23
E.2.4 Main outcome
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E.3 Experiment 1.3 – Cognitive constraints placebo
Figure E.1: Belief elicitation
Figure E.2: Treatment screen
25
Figure E.3: Willingsness to read about GOP Tax Bill in the NYT
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E.4 Experiment 1.4 – Information demand
For this experiment, we provide the instructions for the measurement of people’s demand
for information about the CBO estimates about the consequences of the (i) Trump Tax
Plan and (ii) the Trump Healthcare Plan. The order of these two blocks was randomized.
Figure E.4: Demand for information: Tax Bill
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Figure E.5: Demand for information: Health Bill
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E.5 Experiment 1.5 – External validity
We provide the instructions for the measurement of people’s willingness to pay for a
digital subscription to the New York Times. The demand for news was measured as in the
main filtering design (Experiment 1.1; see Table 1).
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E.6 Experiment 1.6
We provide the instructions for the (i) financially incentivized pre-treatment belief elicita-
tion, (ii) the information treatment, and (iii) the demand for news.
Figure E.6: Explanations of probability
32
Figure E.7: Explanations of incentive payment
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Figure E.8: Beliefs about reporting I
Figure E.9: Treatment screen
34
Figure E.10: Article demand
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E.7 Experiment 2 – false claims
Figure E.11: Policy views
36
Figure E.12: Acceptability of using unverified sources
37
Figure E.13: Prior CNN consumption
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Figure E.14: Prior beliefs about false claims made by CNN
Figure E.15: Addressing curiosity
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Figure E.16: Beliefs about CNN’s reporting
Notes: The order of the two options was randomized.
Figure E.17: Information treatment
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Figure E.18: Article demand
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Figure E.19: Perceptions of CNN I
42
Figure E.20: Perceptions of CNN II
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Figure E.21: Perceptions of CNN III
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E.8 Experiment 3 – Deceptive spin
We provide the instructions for (i) beliefs about the shutdown, (ii) beliefs about reporting,
(iii) the information treatment, and (iv) the measure of demand for news.
Figure E.22: Beliefs about shutdown
45
Figure E.23: Belief elicitation of reporting
Figure E.24: Treatment screen
46
Figure E.25: Willingness to read about GOP Tax Bill in the NYT
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